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We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework in which firms are large and
have market power with respect to both products and labor, and in which a firm’s de-
cisions are affected by its ownership structure. We characterize the Cournot–Walras
equilibrium of an economy where each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of
shareholder utilities—rendering the equilibrium independent of price normalization.
In a one-sector economy, if returns to scale are non-increasing, then an increase in
“effective” market concentration (which accounts for common ownership) leads to de-
clines in employment, real wages, and the labor share. Yet when there are multiple
sectors, due to an intersectoral pecuniary externality, an increase in common owner-
ship could stimulate the economy when the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to
the elasticity of substitution in product markets. We characterize for which ownership
structures the monopolistically competitive limit or an oligopolistic one is attained as
the number of sectors in the economy increases. When firms have heterogeneous con-
stant returns to scale technologies, we find that an increase in common ownership leads
to markets that are more concentrated.
KEYWORDS: Common ownership, portfolio diversification, macro economy, corpo-
rate governance, labor share, market power, oligopsony, antitrust policy.
1. INTRODUCTION
OLIGOPOLY is widespread and allegedly on the rise. Many industries are characterized
by oligopolistic conditions—including, but not limited to, the digital ones dominated
by GAFAM: Google (now Alphabet), Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft. These
firms, as well as others, have influence in the aggregate economy.1 Yet oligopoly is seldom
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considered by macroeconomic models, which focus on monopolistic competition because
of its analytical tractability. A typical limitation of monopolistic competition models is that
they have no role for market concentration to play in conditioning competition because
the summary statistic for competition is the elasticity of substitution. In the field of in-
ternational trade, a few papers consider oligopoly—but with a continuum of sectors and
hence with negligible firms in relation to the economy (Neary (2003a, 2003b), Atkeson
and Burstein (2008)). Furthermore, all these papers assume that firms maximize profits
even with ownership structures which induce a departure from profit maximization.
In this paper, we build a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopoly allowing for
ownership diversification, characterize its equilibrium and comparative statics properties,
and then use it to analyze the effect of competition policies. Our contribution is mostly
methodological, although we have applied the multisector version of our model elsewhere
to explain the evolution of macroeconomic magnitudes in a calibration exercise (Azar and
Vives (2018, 2019a)). We adopt this approach in light of (a) the increasing concentration
in the U.S. economy with respect to both product and labor markets and (b) the increasing
extent of common ownership due to the increase in institutional investment—especially
in index funds (thus, for almost 90% of S&P 500 firms, the largest proportion of shares
is held by the “Big 3” asset managers: BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street). These
trends have raised concerns of increased market power and markups (Azar (2012), Azar,
Schmalz, and Tecu (2018); De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2020)) as well as calls for
antitrust action and regulation of common ownership, topics that are hotly debated (see,
e.g., Elhauge (2016), Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl (2017)).
The difficulties of incorporating oligopoly into a general equilibrium framework have
hindered the modeling of market power in macroeconomics and international trade. The
reason is that there is no simple objective for the firm when firms are not price takers.2 In
a general equilibrium, moreover, firms with pricing power will affect not only their own
respective profits but also the wealth of consumers and therefore demand (these feedback
effects are sometimes referred to as “Ford effects”). Firms that are large relative to factor
markets also have to take into account their impact on factor prices. Gabszewicz and
Vial (1972) proposed the Cournot–Walras equilibrium concept assuming firms maximize
profit in general equilibrium oligopoly, but then equilibrium depends on the choice of
numéraire.3 This problem has been sidestepped by assuming that there is only one good
(an outside good or numéraire that owners of the firm care about; see, e.g., Mas-Colell
(1982)) or that firms are small relative to the economy—be it in monopolistic competition
(Hart (1983)) or sector oligopoly (Neary (2003a)).
Furthermore, a question arises as to what is the objective of the firm when there is over-
lapping ownership due to owners’ diversification. If a firm’s shareholders have holdings
in competing firms, they would benefit from high prices through their effect not only on
their own profits, but also on the profits of rival firms, as well as internalizing other ex-
ternalities between firms (Gordon (1990), Hansen and Lott (1996)). Rotemberg (1984)
2With price-taking firms, a firm’s shareholders agree unanimously that the objective of the firm should be
to maximize its own profits. This result is known as the Fisher separation theorem (DeAngelo (1981)), which
Hart (1979) extended to incomplete markets. In fact, Arrow’s impossibility result on preference aggregation
was derived precisely when attempting to generalize the theory of the firm with multiple owners (see Arrow
(1984)).
3When firms have market power, the outcome of their optimization depends on what price is taken as the
numéraire since by changing the numéraire the profit function is generally not a monotone transformation of
the original one (see Ginsburgh (1994)).
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proposed a parsimonious model in which the firm’s manager maximizes a weighted aver-
age of shareholders’ utilities and thus internalizes inter-firm externalities.4
We build a model of oligopoly under general equilibrium, allowing firms to be large
in relation to the economy, and then examine the effect of oligopoly on macroeconomic
performance. The ownership structure allows investors to diversify both intra- and inter-
industry. We assume that firms maximize a weighted average of shareholder utilities in
Cournot–Walras equilibrium. The weights in a firm’s objective function are given by the
influence or “control weight” of each shareholder. This approach solves the numéraire
problem because indirect utilities depend only on relative prices and not on the choice
of numéraire. Firms are assumed to make strategic decisions that account for the effect
of their actions on prices and wages. When making decisions about hiring, for instance, a
firm realizes that increasing employment could result in upward pricing pressure on real
wages—reducing not only the firm’s own profits but also the profits of all other firms in
its shareholders’ portfolios.
We develop first a base model with one sector to present our equilibrium concept and
comparative static results, and then we extend it to a multi-sector economy suitable for
calibration. The multi-sector model is parsimonious and identifies the key parameters
driving equilibrium: elasticity of substitution across industries, elasticity of the labor sup-
ply, together with the market concentration of each industry, and the ownership structure
(i.e., extent of diversification) of investors.
Our approach may shed light on some leading questions. How do output, labor de-
mand, prices, and wages depend on market concentration and the degree of common
ownership? To what extent are markups in product markets, and markdowns in the labor
market, affected by how much the firm internalizes other firms’ profits? Can common
ownership be pro-competitive in a general equilibrium framework? How do common
ownership effects change when the number of industries increases? In the presence of
ownership diversification, is the monopolistically competitive limit (as described by Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977)) attained when firms become small relative to the market?—and, more
generally, how is that limit affected by ownership structure? Is traditional antitrust policy
a complement or rather a substitute with respect to controlling common ownership when
the aim is boosting employment?5
In the base model that we develop, there is one good in addition to leisure; also, the
model assumes oligopoly in the product market and oligopsony in the labor market. Firms
compete by setting their labor demands à la Cournot and thus have market power. There
is a continuum of risk-neutral owners, who each have a proportion of their respective
shares invested in one firm and have the balance invested in the market portfolio (say, an
4The maximization of the objective function “weighted average of shareholder utilities” depends on the
cardinal properties of shareholders’ preferences (violating Arrow’s ordinal postulate). However, it can be mi-
crofounded using a purely ordinal model—provided shareholder preferences are random from the perspective
of the managers who run the firms (Azar (2012, 2017), Brito, Osório, Ribeiro, and Vasconcelos (2018)). Azar
(2012) and Brito et al. (2018) showed that, in a probabilistic voting setting where two managers compete for
shareholder votes by developing strategic reputations, the firm’s objective will be to maximize a weighted av-
erage of shareholder utilities without any coordination of the shareholders. It is worth noting that the Big 3
together have stakes that average close to 20% of each publicly traded company in the United States (Fichtner,
Heemskerk, and Garcia-Bernardo (2017)). This gives them enough voting power to be pivotal often. Moreover,
Aggarwal, Dahiya, and Prabhala (2019) showed that shareholder dissent hurts directors and that director elec-
tions matter because of career concerns. In particular, these authors showed that increasing the votes withheld
by only 10% leads to a 24% increase in the likelihood of director turnover.
5Azar and Vives (2019b) examined the interaction of competition policy with other government policies to
foster employment.
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index fund). This formulation is numéraire-free and allows us to characterize the equi-
librium. The extent to which firms internalize rival firms’ profits depends on market con-
centration and investor diversification. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium, and then characterize its comparative statics properties, while assuming that
labor supply is upward sloping (and allowing for some economies of scale in production).
The results establish that, in our model of a one-sector economy, the markdown of real
wages with respect to the marginal product of labor is driven by the common ownership–
modified Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) for the labor market and also by labor sup-
ply elasticity (but not by product market power, since ownership is proportional to con-
sumption). We perform comparative statics on the equilibrium (employment and real
wages) with respect to market concentration and degree of common ownership, and we
develop an example featuring Cobb–Douglas firms and consumers with additively sep-
arable isoelastic preferences. We find that increased market concentration—due either
to fewer firms or to more diversification (common ownership)—depresses the economy
by reducing employment, output, real wages, and the labor share (if one assumes non-
increasing returns to scale). When firms have different constant returns to scale (CRS)
technologies, an increase in common ownership leads to a more concentrated market (as
measured by the HHI) because more efficient firms then gain market share at the expense
of weaker rivals. Furthermore, the minimal relative productivity for the least productive
firm to be viable is increasing in the extent of common ownership.
We extend our base model to allow for multiple sectors, and for differentiated prod-
ucts across sectors, with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregators. The firms
supplying each industry’s product are finite in number and engage in Cournot compe-
tition. We allow here for investors to diversify both in an intra-industry fund and in an
economy-wide index fund. In this extension, a firm deciding whether to marginally in-
crease its employment must consider the effect of that increase on three relative prices:
(i) the increase would reduce the relative price of the firm’s own products, (ii) it would
boost real wages, and (iii) it would increase the relative price of products in other indus-
tries (i.e., because overall consumption would increase). This third effect, referred to as
inter-sector pecuniary externality, is internalized only when there is common ownership in-
volving the firm and firms in other industries. In this case, the markdown of real wages
relative to the marginal product of labor increases with the modified HHI values for the
labor market and product markets, but decreases with the pecuniary externality (weighted
by the extent of competitor profit internalization due to common ownership). We find that
common ownership always has an anti-competitive effect when increasing intra-industry
diversification, but that it can have a pro-competitive effect when increasing economy-
wide diversification if the elasticity of labor supply is high in relation to the elasticity of
substitution among product varieties. In this case, the relative impact of profit internaliza-
tion on the level of market power in product markets is higher than in the labor market.
It is worth remarking that when the elasticity of labor supply is high enough, an increase
in economy-wide common ownership always has a pro-competitive effect, no matter how
many sectors the economy has.
We then consider the limiting case when the number of sectors tends to infinity. This
formulation allows us to check for whether—and, if so, under what circumstances—the
monopolistically competitive market of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) or the oligopolistic ones
of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Neary (2003a, 2003b) are attained, in the presence
of common ownership, when firms become small relative to the market; it also enables a
determination of how ownership structure affects that competitive limit. We find that with
incomplete asymptotic diversification, as the number of sectors N in the economy grows,
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the monopolistically competitive limit is attained if there is either one firm per sector or
full intra-industry common ownership. If full diversification is attained at least as fast as
1/
√
N , then profit internalization is positive in the limit and the Dixit–Stiglitz limit is not
attained. We obtain that the limit degree of profit internalization is increasing in market
concentration and in how rapidly diversification is achieved. The limit markdown may
increase or decrease with profit internalization.
Competition policy in the one-sector economy can foster employment and increase real
wages by reducing market concentration (with non-increasing returns) and/or the level of
diversification (common ownership), which serve as complementary tools. When there
are multiple sectors, it is optimal for worker-consumers to have full diversification (com-
mon ownership) economy-wide but no extra diversification intra-industry—that is, when
the elasticity of substitution in product markets is low relative to the elasticity of labor
supply. In this case, competition policy should seek to alter only intra-industry ownership
structure.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes some further connec-
tions with the literature. Section 3 develops a one-sector model of general equilibrium
oligopoly with labor as the only factor of production; this is where we derive comparative
statics results with respect to the effects of market concentration on employment, wages,
and the labor share. In Section 4, we extend the model to allow for multiple sectors with
differentiated products, and we then derive results that characterize the limit economy as
the number of sectors approaches infinity. We also offer some illustrative calibrations of
the model. Section 5 discusses the implications for competition policies, and we conclude
in Section 6 with a summary and suggestions for further research. Appendix A provides
more detail about the case of increasing returns in production, and the proofs of most
results are given in Appendix B.
2. CONNECTIONS WITH THE LITERATURE
2.1. Theory
Our paper is related to four strands of the literature. The first is the general equilib-
rium with oligopoly à la the Cournot models of Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), Novshek
and Sonnenschein (1978), and Mas-Colell (1982), where the proposed Cournot–Walras
equilibrium assumes that firms maximize profits. Here we assume instead that a firm’s
manager maximizes a weighted average of shareholder utilities and also consider an own-
ership structure that allows for common ownership.
The second strand encompasses the macroeconomic models with Keynesian features
that have incorporated market power. A precursor of those models is the work by one
of Keynes’s contemporaries, Michal Kalecki, on the macroeconomic effects of market
power in a two-class economy (Kalecki (1938, 1954)). The most closely related papers
are perhaps Hart (1982) and d’Aspremont, Ferreira, and Gérard-Varet (1990).6  Hart’s
(1982) work differs from ours in assuming that firms are small relative to the overall
economy and have separate owners. Unions have the labor market power in his model and
so equilibrium real wages are higher than the marginal product of labor; in our model’s
equilibrium, real wages are lower than that marginal product.
In d’Aspremont, Ferreira, and Gérard-Varet (1990), firms are large relative to the econ-
omy; however, it is still assumed that firms maximize profits in terms of an arbitrary
6See Silvestre (1993) for a survey of the market power foundations of macroeconomic policy.
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numéraire and that they compete in prices while taking wages as given with an inelastic
labor supply. We consider instead the more realistic case of an elastic labor supply, which
yields a positive equilibrium real wage even when market power reduces employment to
below the competitive level. Our approach differs from theirs also in that we derive mea-
sures of market concentration, discuss competition policy in a general equilibrium, and
consider effects on the labor share.7 Furthermore, instead of assuming the existence of
consumer-worker-owners (as is typical in the literature), we follow Kalecki (1954) and
distinguish between two groups: worker-consumers and owner-consumers. Our model
has a Kaleckian flavor also in relating product market power to the labor share, since in
Kalecki (1938), the labor share is determined by the economy’s average Lerner index.
The third strand of this literature focuses on international trade models with oligopolis-
tic firms. Neary (2003a) considered a continuum of industries with Cournot competition
in each industry, taking the marginal utility of wealth (instead of the wage) as given. Work-
ers supply labor inelastically and firms maximize profits. Neary (2003a) found a negative
relationship between the labor share and market concentration. Our work differs in that
firms are large relative to the economy, and therefore have market power in both prod-
uct and labor markets, and in considering the effects of firms’ ownership structure. Neary
(2003a) also assumed a perfectly inelastic labor supply, so that changes in market power
can affect neither employment nor output in equilibrium. In contrast, we allow for an in-
creasing labor supply function and examine more potential effects of competition policy.
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) also considered a continuum of sectors with Cournot com-
petition in each industry. These authors assumed that goods produced in a country within
a sector are better substitutes than across sectors. The aim of the paper is to reproduce
stylized facts regarding international relative prices.
It is worth noting that in both Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Neary (2003a), as well
as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), there is a representative household that owns a market
portfolio in all the firms. And yet, the firms are assumed to maximize their own profits
even though no shareholder would actually want this. Thus, there is a tension between
the assumed ownership structure and the profit maximization assumption. The results in
Section 4.3, under our assumptions with two classes of agents, in which we consider the
limit as the number of sectors N tends to infinity, make this tension clear. Specifically,
with full asymptotic diversification as N tends to infinity, we obtain the results associated
to Dixit–Stiglitz or Neary (2003a) only when there is no rivals’ profit internalization in the




The fourth strand relates to ownership structure and oligopoly in partial equilibrium.
In our model, managers internalize the control of the firm by the different owners as in
Rotemberg (1984) and O’Brien and Salop (2000), but ours is not a model of the stake-
holder corporation as in Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet (2015) since managers only internal-
ize the welfare of owners. The fact that overlapping ownership may relax competition was
observed by Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) and explored by Reynolds and Snapp (1986),
and Bresnahan and Salop (1986). Since overlapping ownership may internalize externali-
ties between firms, it may have ambiguous welfare effects. Indeed, overlapping ownership
may increase market power and raise margins yet simultaneously internalize technolog-
ical spillovers and increase productivity (López and Vives (2019)); see He and Huang
7Gabaix (2011) also considered firms that are large in relation to the economy but with no strategic interac-
tion among them; his aim was to demonstrate how microeconomic shocks to large firms can create meaningful
aggregate fluctuations. Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) pursued a similar goal but
assumed that firms are price takers.
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(2017) for compatible evidence and Geng, Hau, and Lai (2016) for how vertical com-
mon ownership links may improve the internalization of patent complementarities. Here
we will show how common ownership can have pro-competitive effects in a multi-sector
economy.8
2.2. Empirics
Our approach may speak about macro trends in the economy in relation to the effects
of the evolution of institutional investment and common ownership patterns, product and
labor market concentration, markups and the declining labor share, the consequences for
competition and investment, and the implications for policy.
The world of dispersed ownership described by Berle and Means (1932) no longer exists
in the United States. The rise in institutional stock ownership over the past 35 years has
been formidable. Pension, mutual, and exchange-traded funds now own the lion’s share
of publicly traded U.S. firms. The asset management industry is concentrated around the
three largest managers (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street), and there has been a
shift from active to passive investors (who are more diversified). This evolution of the
asset management industry has transformed the ownership structure of firms. In any in-
dustry today, large firms are likely to have common shareholders with significant shares
(Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2018)).9
Before surveying the evidence on these macroeconomic trends, let us examine what
evidence there is on how common ownership might affect the incentives of managers.
Common owners in an industry may have the ability and incentive to influence man-
agement. Indeed, both voice and exit can strengthen with common ownership (Edmans,
Levit, and Reilly (2019)), and not pushing for aggressiveness in management contracts
is a mechanism by which common owners can relax competition (Antón, Ederer, Gine,
and Schmalz (2018)). Note also that, even if a fund follows a passive strategy and even if a
good part of the increase in common ownership is due to the rise of passive funds, we can-
not assume that the fund is a passive owner (Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016)). In fact,
large passive funds tend to exhibit a more “disciplinarian” attitude toward management
(Bolton, Li, Ravina, and Rosenthal (2019))—and institutional common owners not only
internalize governance externalities but also are more likely to vote against management
(He, Huang, and Zhao (2019)).10 There are, however, countervailing agency problems:
Bebchuk and Hirst (2019) pointed out that index fund managers may not have incen-
tives to monitor management (for evidence that index funds are less likely to vote against
management than are active funds, see Brav, Jiang, Li, Pinnington (2019), Heath, Mac-
ciocchi, Michaely, and Ringgenberg (2019)). Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) showed
that increased passive ownership impedes high-cost governance activities and increases
8See Vives (2020) for an exposition of (a) the tension between market power and efficiency as an outcome
of common ownership and (b) a parallel with debates in the 1960s and 1970s over the “structure–conduct–
performance” paradigm in the field of industrial organization.
9Minority cross-ownership is also common and has anti-competitive effects (Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volk-
erink (2000), Brito et al. (2018), Nain and Wang (2018)).
10Furthermore, portfolio managers have incentives to increase, even marginally, the value of firms in their
portfolio because doing so increases management fees (Lewellen and Lewellen (2018)). Jahnke’s (2019) field
research, based on 50 interviews with large-asset managers, supports the view that they have considerable in-
centives to engage in corporate governance activities for the purpose of increasing portfolio values. This find-
ing is consistent with the views expressed by large-asset managers themselves in their “corporate stewardship”
reports (e.g., BlackRock (2019)).
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agency costs.11 In short, the link between increased passive diversification and relaxed
competition may stem either from the internalization by managers of the common own-
ers’ interests or from increased agency costs that allow managers to slack.12
Recent empirical research has renewed interest in the issue of aggregate market
power and its consequences for macroeconomic outcomes. Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely
(2019) claimed that concentration has increased in more than 75% of U.S. industries
over the past two decades and also that firms in industries with larger increases in
product market concentration have enjoyed higher profit margins and positive abnor-
mal stock returns—suggesting that market power is the driver of these outcomes.13  De
Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2020) documented, for the U.S. economy, a large in-
crease in markups (in excess of the increased overhead) and in economic profits since
1955. These authors attributed those increases to a re-allocation of market share: from
low-productivity, low-markup, high–labor share firms to high-productivity, high-markup,
low–labor share firms (in line with the results reported in Autor et al. (2020) and Kehrig
and Vincent (2018)). Autor et al. (2020) posited that globalization and technological
change lead to concentration and to the rise of what they called “superstar” firms, which
have high profits and a low labor share. As the importance of superstar firms rises (with
the increase in concentration), the aggregate labor share falls.14 We find that increased
common ownership generates a re-allocation of market share from low-productivity, low-
markup, high–labor share firms to high-productivity, high-markup, low–labor share firms.
There is also substantial evidence that large firms have market power not just in product
markets but also in labor markets.15 Furthermore, there are claims also of increasing labor
market concentration (Benmelech, Bergman, and Kim (2020)).
In addition to increases in concentration as traditionally measured, recent research has
shown that: (i) increased overlapping ownership of firms by financial institutions (and
by funds in particular)—what we refer to as common ownership—has led to substantial
increases in effective (i.e., augmented by common ownership) concentration indices in the
airline and banking industries; and (ii) this greater concentration is associated with higher
prices (Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2018)). Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017b) suggested that
the increase in index and quasi-index fund ownership has played a role in the decline
of aggregate investment.16  Summers (2016) and Stiglitz (2017) linked increases in market
11Hansen and Lott (1996) observed that higher agency costs may be associated with more managerial dis-
cretion when managers internalize externalities through portfolio value maximization.
12Yet when managers hold shares in their firm, agency costs could mitigate the anti-competitive effects of
common ownership (see Azar (2020)).
13Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (2020) stated that, for the period 1982–2012, “according
to all measures of sales concentration, industries have become more concentrated on average.”
14Blonigen and Pierce (2016) attributed the U.S. increase in markups to increased merger activity. Barkai
(2020) documented declining labor and capital shares in the U.S. economy over the past 30 years, an outcome
that is consistent with an increase in markups. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019), summarizing a body of work,
argued that automation always reduces the labor share in industry value added and that it will tend also to
reduce the economy’s overall labor share. For example, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) reported that the
labor share declines more in industries (e.g., manufacturing) that are more amenable to automation.
15A thriving literature in labor economics has established that individual firms face labor supply curves that
are imperfectly elastic, which is indicative of substantial labor market power (Falch (2010); Ransom and Sims
(2010); Staiger, Spetz, and Phibbs (2010); Matsudaira (2013); Azar, Marinescu, and Steinbaum (2020)).
16There is an empirical debate on the validity and robustness of these results, since the Modified HHI is
endogenous (see Gramlich and Grundl (2017), Kennedy, O’Brien, Song, and Waehrer (2017), O’Brien and
Waehrer (2017), Dennis, Gerardi, and Schenone (2019)). Backus, Conlon, and Sinkinson (2018) adopted a
structural approach in their study of the cereal industry and found large potential (but not actual) implied
effects of common ownership relative to mergers.
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power to the potential secular stagnation of developed economies, and Boller and Morton
(2020) used an event study of inclusion in the S&P 500 index to conclude that common
ownership increases profits.
Some of the recent empirical papers develop theoretical frameworks that link changes
in market power to the labor share (Eggertsson, Robbins, and Wold (2018), Barkai
(2020)) and to investment and interest rates (Brun and González (2017), Gutiérrez and
Philippon (2017a), Eggertsson, Robbins, and Wold (2018)). The models developed by
Brun and González (2017), Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017a), Eggertsson, Robbins, and
Wold (2018), and Barkai (2020) are based on a monopolistic competition framework with
markups determined exogenously by the parameter reflecting the elasticity of substitution
among products. In all cases, only product market power is considered and the firms are
assumed to have no market power in labor or capital markets. Our theoretical framework
differs from these because we explicitly model oligopoly and strategic interaction between
firms in general equilibrium, which enables the study of how competition policy affects the
macro economy. The concern about market power in both product and labor markets is
a subject of policy debate; for example, the Council of Economic Advisers produced two
reports (CEA (2016a, 2016b)) on the issue of market power. Increased common owner-
ship has also raised antitrust concerns (Baker (2016), Elhauge (2016)) and led to some
bold proposals for remedies (Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl (2017), Scott Morton and
Hovenkamp (2018)) as well as calls for caution (Rock and Rubinfeld (2017)).
There is an empirical debate about the trends in concentration and markups. Indeed,
Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Trachter (2018) found diverging trends for aggregate (increas-
ing) and (decreasing) concentration. Rinz (2018) and Berger, Herkenhoff, and Mongey
(2019) found also that local labor market concentration has gone down. Traina (2018)
and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2019) found flat markups when accounting for indirect
costs of production. Increases in concentration are modest overall in both product and la-
bor markets and/or on too broadly defined industries to generate severe product market
power problems (e.g., HHIs remain below antitrust thresholds in relevant product and
geographic markets; e.g., Shapiro (2018)).
The question, then, is how to reconcile the evolution of concentration in relevant mar-
kets with evidence on the evolution of margins, increasing corporate profits, and de-
creased labor share. According to the monopolistic competition model, margins increase
when products become less differentiated. It is, however, not plausible that large changes
in product differentiation happen in short spans of time. We provide an alternative frame-
work in which market concentration and ownership structure both have a role to play.
3. ONE-SECTOR ECONOMY WITH LARGE FIRMS
In this section, we first describe the model in detail. We then characterize the equi-
librium and comparative statics properties with homogeneous and heterogeneous firms
before offering a constant elasticity example. We conclude with a summary and by de-
scribing an extension that allows for investment.
3.1. Model Setup
We consider an economy with (a) a finite number of firms, each of them large relative to
the economy as a whole, and (b) an infinite number (a continuum) of people, each of them
infinitesimal relative to the economy as a whole. There are two types of people, workers
and owners, and both types consume the good produced by firms. Workers obtain income
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to pay for their consumption by offering their time to a firm in exchange for wages. The
owners do not work for the firms; an owner’s income derives instead from ownership of
the firm’s shares, which entitles the owner to control the firm and to a share of its profits.
There is a unit mass of workers and a unit mass of owners, and we use IW and IO to denote
(respectively) the set of workers and the set of owners. There are a total of J firms in the
economy.
There are two goods: a consumer good, with price p; and leisure, with price w. Each
worker has a time endowment of T hours but owns no other assets. Workers have pref-
erences over consumption and leisure—as represented by the utility function U(CiLi),
where Ci is worker i’s level of consumption and Li is i’s labor supply. We assume that the
utility function is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies UC > 0, UL < 0, UCC < 0,
ULL < 0, and UCL ≤ 0.17 The last of these expressions implies that the marginal utility of
consumption is decreasing in labor supply.
The owners hold all of the firms’ shares. We assume that the owners are divided uni-
formly into J groups, one per firm, with owners in group j owning 1 −φ+φ/J of firm j
and owning φ/J of the other firms; here φ ∈ [01]. Thus φ can be interpreted as repre-
senting the level of portfolio diversification, or (quasi-)indexation, in the economy.18
If we use πk to denote the profits of firm k, then the financial wealth of owner i in
group j is given by




Total financial wealth is equal to
∑J
k=1 πk, the sum of the profits of all firms. The own-
ers obtain utility from consumption only, and for simplicity we assume that their utility
function is UO(Ci)= Ci. A firm produces using only labor as a resource, and it has a twice
continuously differentiable production function F(L) with F ′ > 0 and F(0)≥ 0. We allow
for both F ′′ ≤ 0 and F ′′ > 0. We use Lj to denote the amount of labor employed by firm j.
Firm j’s profits are πj = pF(Lj)−wLj .
We assume that firm j’s objective function is to maximize a weighted average of the (in-
direct) utilities of its owners, where the weights are proportional to the number of shares.
In other words, we suppose that ownership confers control in proportion to the shares
owned.19 In this simple case, because shareholders do not work and there is only one con-
sumption good, their indirect utility (as a function of prices, wages, and their wealth level)
17Here Ux is the partial derivative of U with respect to variable x, and Uxy is the cross-derivative of U with
respect to x and y .
18Each owner in group j is endowed with a fraction (1 − φ + φ/J)/(1/J) of firm j and a fraction
(φ/J)/(1/J) = φ of each of the other firms. Since the mass of the group is 1/J, it follows that the combined
ownership in firm j of all the owners in group j is equal to 1 −φ+φ/J and that their combined ownership in
each of the other firms is φ/J. The combined ownership shares of all shareholders sum to 1 for every firm:
1 −φ+φ/J
1/J︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ownership of firm j by an owner in group j
× 1/J︸︷︷︸
Mass of group j
+ (J − 1)× φ/J
1/J︸︷︷︸
Ownership of firm j by an owner in group k = j
× 1/J︸︷︷︸
Mass of group k
= 1
19See O’Brien and Salop (2000) for other possibilities that allow for cash flow and control rights to differ.
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After some algebra we obtain that, for firms’ managers, the objective function simplifies
to maximizing (in terms of the consumption good) the sum of own profits and the profits










λ = (2 −φ)φ
(1 −φ)2J + (2 −φ)φ
We interpret λ as the weight—due to common ownership—that each firm’s objective
function assigns to the profits of other firms relative to its own profits. This term was
called the coefficient of “effective sympathy” between firms by Edgeworth (1881) and
also by Cyert and DeGroot (1973). The weight λ increases with φ, or the level of portfolio
diversification in the economy, and also with market concentration 1/J. We remark that
λ = 0 if φ = 0 and λ = 1 if φ = 1, so all firms behave “as one” when portfolios are fully
diversified.
Next, we define our concept of equilibrium.
3.2. Equilibrium Concept
An imperfectly competitive equilibrium with shareholder representation consists of (a) a
price function that assigns consumption good prices to the production plans of firms,
(b) an allocation of consumption goods, and (c) a set of production plans for firms such
that the following statements hold:
(1) The prices and allocation of consumption goods are a competitive equilibrium rel-
ative to the production plans of firms.
(2) Production plans constitute a Cournot–Nash equilibrium when the objective func-
tion of each firm is a weighted average of shareholders’ indirect utilities.
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It follows then that if a price function, an allocation of consumption goods, and a set
of production plans for firms is an imperfectly competitive equilibrium with shareholder
representation, then also a scalar multiple of prices will be an equilibrium with the same
allocation of goods and production. The reason is that (a) the indirect utility function is
homogeneous of degree 0 in prices and income; and (b) if a consumption and production
allocation satisfies both (1) and (2) with the original price function, then it will continue
to do so when prices are scaled.
We start by defining a competitive equilibrium relative to the firms’ production plans—
in the particular model of this section, a Walrasian equilibrium conditional on the quanti-
ties of output announced by the firms. To simplify notation, we proxy firm j’s production
plan by the quantity Lj of labor demanded, implicitly setting the planned production quan-
tity equal to F(Lj).
DEFINITION 1—Competitive Equilibrium Relative to Production Plans: A competitive
equilibrium relative to (L1    LJ) is a price system and allocation [{wp}; {CiLi}i∈IW {Ci}i∈IO ] such that the following statements hold:
(i) For i ∈ IW , (CiLi) maximizes U(CiLi) subject to pCi ≤ wLi; for i ∈ IO , Ci =
Wi/p.
(ii) Labor supply equals labor demand by the firms:
∫
i∈IW Li di =
∑J
j=1 Lj .
(iii) Total consumption equals total production:
∫
i∈IW ∪IO Ci di =
∑J
j=1 F(Lj).
A price function W(L) and P(L) assigns prices {wp} to each labor (production) plan
vector L ≡ (L1    LJ), such that for any L, [W(L)P(L); {CiLi}i∈IW  {Ci}i∈IO ] is a com-
petitive equilibrium for some allocation {{CiLi}i∈IW  {Ci}i∈IO }. A given firm makes em-
ployment and production plans conditional on the price function, which captures how
the firm expects prices will react to its plans as well as its expectations regarding the em-
ployment and production plans of other firms. The economy is in equilibrium when every
firm’s employment and production plans coincide with the expectations of all other firms.
DEFINITION 2—Cournot–Walras Equilibrium With Shareholder Representation: A
Cournot–Walras equilibrium with shareholder representation is a price function (W(·)
P(·)), an allocation ({C∗i Li}i∈IW , {C∗i }i∈IO ), and a set of production plans L∗ such that:
(i) [W(L∗)P(L∗); {C∗i Li}i∈IW  {C∗i }i∈IO ] is a competitive equilibrium relative to L∗;
and
(ii) the production plan vector L∗ is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a game in










Here p = P(L), w =W(L), and πj = pF(Lj)−wLj for j = 1     J.
Note that the objective function of firm j depends only on the real wage ω = w/p,
which is invariant to any normalization of prices.
3.3. Characterization of Equilibrium
Given firms’ production plans, we derive the real wage—under a competitive
equilibrium—by assuming that workers maximize their utility U(CiLi) subject to the
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budget constraint Ci ≤ ωLi. This constraint is always binding because utility increases
with consumption but decreases with labor. Substituting the budget constraint into the





Our assumptions on the utility function guarantee that the second-order condition
holds. Hence the first-order condition for an interior solution implicitly defines a labor
supply function h(ω) for worker i such that labor supply is given by Li = min{h(ω)T };
this coincides with aggregate (average) labor supply, which is
∫
i∈I Li di. Let η denote the
elasticity of labor supply. We assume that preferences are such that h(·) is increasing.20
Maintained Assumption. h′(ω) > 0 for ω ∈ [0∞).
This assumption is consistent with a wide range of empirical studies showing that the
elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages is positive. A meta-analysis of such studies
based on different methodologies (Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011)) concludes
that the long-run elasticity of aggregate hours worked with respect to the real wage is
about 0.59. We assume that the range of the labor supply function is [0T ], which—when
combined with the preceding maintained assumption—guarantees the existence of an
increasing inverse labor supply function h−1 that assigns a real wage to every possible
labor supply level on [0T ]. In a competitive equilibrium relative to the vector of labor







Any competitive equilibrium relative to firms’ production plans L must satisfy either
ω = h−1(L) if L =∑Jj=1 Lj < T or ω ≥ h−1(T) if L = T .21 In what follows, we shall use
the price function that assigns ω = h−1(T) when L = T . Given that the relative price
depends only on L, we can define (with only minor abuse of notation) the competitive
equilibrium real-wage function ω(L) = h−1(L).
3.4. Cournot–Walras Equilibrium: Existence and Characterization
Here we identify the conditions under which symmetric equilibria exist. We also offer a
characterization that relates the markdown of wages (relative to the marginal product of
labor) to the economy’s level of market concentration.
20We can obtain the slope of h by taking the derivative with respect to the real wage in the first-order









21The implication here is that the competitive equilibrium real wage as a function of (L1    LJ) depends
on firms’ individual labor demands only through their effect on aggregate labor demand L.
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We start by noting that firm j’s best response depends only on the aggregate response
of its rivals,
∑
k =j Lk, because the marginal return to firm j is F




′(L). Let Eω′ ≡ −ω′′L/ω′ denote the elasticity of the inverse labor supply’s
slope. Then a sufficient condition for the game (among firms) to be of the “strategic
substitutes” variety is that Eω′ < 1. In this case, one firm’s increase in labor demand is met
by reductions in labor demand by the other firms and so there is an equilibrium (Vives
(1999), Theorem 2.7). Furthermore, if F ′′ ≤ 0 and Eω′ < 1, then the objective of the firm
is strictly concave and the slope of its best response to a rival’s change in labor demand is
greater than −1. In that event, the equilibrium is unique (per Vives (1999), Theorem 2.8).
PROPOSITION 1: Let Eω′ < 1. Then the game among firms is one of strategic substitutes
and an equilibrium exists. Moreover, if returns are non-increasing (i.e., if F ′′ ≤ 0), then the
equilibrium is unique, symmetric, and locally stable under continuous adjustment (unless
F ′′ = 0 and λ = 1). In an interior symmetric equilibrium, if the total employment level L∗ ∈
(0T ), then the following statements hold:











where H = (1 + λ(J − 1))/J is the modified HHI of the labor market and where H
and μ are each increasing in φ.
(b) Both L∗ and ω∗ are increasing in J and decreasing in φ.
(c) The share of a firm’s income received by workers, (ω(L∗)L∗)/(JF(L∗/J)), decreases
with φ.
REMARK: To ensure a unique equilibrium, it is enough that −F ′′(Lj)+ (1 −λ)ω′(L) >
0 if the second-order condition holds. In this case, we may have a unique (and symmetric)
equilibrium with moderately increasing returns. Note that F ′′ < 0 is required if the condi-
tion is to hold for all λ. Furthermore, it is possible to show that, together, the inequalities
−F ′′ + (1 −λ)ω′ > 0 and ω′ > 0 are enough to ensure that a symmetric equilibrium exists
and, in addition, that there are no asymmetric equilibria. And if also F ′′ ≤ 0 and Eω′ < 2
when evaluated at a candidate symmetric equilibrium, then the symmetric equilibrium is
unique for any λ (and is stable provided that λ < 1). These relaxed conditions allow for
strategies that are strategic complements.
REMARK: If F ′′ = 0 (constant returns) and if λ = 1 (φ = 1, firm cartel), then there is
a unique symmetric equilibrium and also multiple asymmetric equilibria, with each firm
employing an arbitrary amount between zero and the monopoly level of employment and
with the total employment by firms equal to that under monopoly. The reason is that the
shareholders in this case are indifferent over which firm engages in the actual production.
REMARK: The market power friction at a symmetric equilibrium can also be expressed
in terms of the markup of product prices over the effective marginal cost of labor (mc ≡
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w/F ′(L/JN)),











The Lerner-type misalignment of the marginal product of labor and the real wage (i.e.,
the markdown μ of real wages) is equal to the modified HHI divided by the elasticity η of
labor supply. The question then arises of why there is no effect of the concentration and/or
the residual demand elasticity in the product market. In other words: why does there seem
to be no effect of product market power? The reason is that, when there is a single good,
this effect (equal to product market modified HHI divided by demand elasticity) is exactly
compensated by the effect of owners internalizing their consumption—that is, since they
are also consumers of the product that the oligopolistic firms produce. Owners use firm
profits only for purchasing the good.22
Additively Separable Isoelastic Preferences and Cobb–Douglas Production
We now consider a special case of the model, one in which consumer-workers have




1 − σ −χ
L1+ξi
1 + ξ
where σ ∈ (01) and χξ > 0. The elasticity of labor supply is η = (1 − σ)/(ξ + σ) >
0, and the equilibrium real wage in the competitive equilibrium—given firms’ aggregate







and Eω′ = 1 − 1
η
< 1
The production function is F(Lj) = ALαj , where A> 0, 0 < α ≤ 1, and returns are non-
increasing.
The objective function of each firm is strictly concave, and so Proposition 1 applies. It








Figure 1 illustrates that an increase in common ownership—that is, an increase in φ
or a decrease in the number of firms—reduces equilibrium employment and real wages.
22In contrast to the partial equilibrium model of Farrell (1985), the equilibrium markdown in our model—
because of the labor market power effect—is not zero even when ownership is proportional to consumption.
If the labor market is competitive (i.e., if η = ∞), then the equilibrium markdown is zero. See also Mas-Colell
and Silvestre (1991).
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FIGURE 1.—Effect of an increase in market concentration on equilibrium real wages and employment in
the one-sector model. The model parameters for the plot are: A = 6, J = 4, α = 05, ξ = 05, σ = 05, and
χ = 05. When φ = 0, the MHHI is H = 025; when φ = 1, the MHHI is H = 1. Here LS refers to the labor
supply curve and LD refers to the curve defined by the firm’s first-order condition while imposing symmetry.
With increasing returns to scale, however, reducing the number of firms involves a trade-
off between market power and efficiency. In that case, a decline in the number of firms
can increase real wages under some conditions.
The symmetric equilibrium is locally stable if α− 1 < (1 −λ)(Jη)−1(1 +H/η)−1, which
means that a range of increasing returns may be allowed provided that an equilibrium
exists. If α > 1, then neither the inequality −F ′′ + (1 − λ)ω′ > 0 nor the payoff global
concavity condition need hold. In Appendix B, we characterize the case where α ∈ (12)
and η ≤ 1 and then give a necessary and sufficient condition for an interior symmetric
equilibrium to exist when returns are increasing. Under that condition, L∗ is decreasing
in φ; yet it may either increase or decrease with J depending on whether the effect on the
markdown or the economies of scale prevail.
3.5. Heterogeneous Firms
When firms have access to different constant returns to scale technologies (CRS), we
confirm the results in Proposition 1 and establish a positive association between common
ownership and the dispersion of market shares.
PROPOSITION 2: Let Eω′ < 1 and firms have potentially different CRS technologies with
Fj(Lj) = AjLj , Aj > 0, j = 1     J. Then an equilibrium exists and is unique with λ < 1.
In an interior equilibrium with L∗ ∈ (0T ), the following statements hold:
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here H = HHI(1−λ)+λ is the modified HHI, and both H and μ̄ are increasing in φ.
(b) The total employment level L∗ and the real wage ω∗ are each decreasing in φ.
(c) The share of income going to workers, (ω(L∗)L∗)/(JF(L∗/J)) = 1/(1+μ̄), decreases
with φ.
(d) If technologies are heterogeneous, then: (a) both the HHI and the minimal relative pro-
ductivity for the least productive firm to be viable (i.e., Amin/Ā, where Ā=∑Jj=1 Aj/J)
are increasing in φ; and (b) only the most productive firm is active when φ → 1.
Thus, under firm heterogeneity, an increase in common ownership as measured by φ
(and λ) leads endogenously to an increase in the Herfindahl–Hirschman index. This fol-
lows because a firm’s market share sj increases (resp. decreases) when λ increases if j
has above-average (resp. below-average) productivity. The implication is that, when com-
mon ownership increases, the variance of sj increases and so the HHI increases as well.
The effect of common ownership is similar to the behavior of a multi-plant monopolist
who shifts production toward the more efficient plants.23 Common ownership thus gener-
ates a re-allocation of market share from low-productivity, low-markup, high–labor share
firms to high-productivity, high-markup, low–labor share firms. As stated in Section 2.2,
a pattern of re-allocation from low- to high-markup U.S. firms in recent decades was
documented by De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger (2020), and Autor et al. (2020) and
Kehrig and Vincent (2018) both found evidence of a re-allocation from high–labor share
to low–labor share firms.
REMARK: At a Cournot interior equilibrium with constant marginal costs, total output
does not depend on the distribution of costs (e.g., Bergstrom and Varian (1985)). Here,
too, we have that total employment depends only on average productivity Ā =∑Jj=1 Aj/J
and not on its variance. However, a technological change that induces a discrete increase
in the dispersion of productivities, large enough to induce the exit of inefficient firms
from the market, does affect equilibrium employment. In addition, an increase in com-
mon ownership may reinforce this effect. Indeed, we can show that the minimal relative
productivity for the least productive firm to be viable (Amin/Ā) is given by (η+λ)/(1−λ)(η+λ)/(1−λ)+1/J ,
which is increasing in λ.24 Moreover, if it is not profitable for the jth least productive firm
to produce a positive amount in equilibrium, then it is also not profitable to produce with
λ′ > λ. As φ → 1, only the most productive firm survives and behaves like a monopsonist.
3.6. Summary and Investment Extension
So far, we have shown that the simple model developed in this section can help make
sense of some recent macroeconomic stylized facts—including persistently low output,
23It follows that increases in common ownership will raise the relative incentives of the more efficient firms
to invest in cost reduction—that is, since they will end up producing more (see the model in López and Vives
(2019)).
24To see that the threshold is increasing in λ, we use Lemma 1 in Appendix B, which shows that, in equilib-
rium, ∂η
∂λ
+ 1 > 0.
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employment, and wages in the presence of high corporate profits and financial wealth—
as a response to a permanent increase in effective concentration (due either to common
ownership or to a reduced number of competitors). Because we have yet to incorporate
investment decisions into the model, there is no real interest rate and so we have nothing
to say about how it is affected. Even so, the model can be extended to include saving,
capital, investment, and the real interest rate. In Azar and Vives (2019a), we presented a
model with workers, owners, and savers and showed that—for investors who are not fully
diversified—either a fall in the number J of firms or a rise in φ, the common ownership
parameter, will lead to an equilibrium with lower levels of capital stock, employment, real
interest rate, real wages, output, and labor share of income. Under certain (reasonable)
conditions, the changes just described will lead also to a declining capital share.
When firms are large relative to the economy, an increase in market power implies that
firms have an incentive to reduce both their employment and investment below the com-
petitive level; this follows because, even though such firms sacrifice in terms of output,
they benefit from lower wages and lower interest rates on every unit of labor and capi-
tal that they employ. The effect described here is present only when firms’ shareholders
perceive that they can affect the economy’s equilibrium level of real wages and real inter-
est rates by changing their production plans. Thus, when oligopolistic firms have market
power over the economy as a whole, their owners can extract rents from both workers and
savers.25
4. MULTIPLE SECTORS
In this section, we extend the model to multiple sectors in a Cobb–Douglas isoelastic
environment. We characterize the equilibrium, uncover new and richer comparative stat-
ics results, and proceed to analyze large markets and convergence to the monopolistic
competition outcome as the number of sectors grows large. We end the section with a
note on calibration of the model.
4.1. Model Setup
Consider an economy with N sectors, each offering a different consumer product. We
assume that both the mass of workers and the mass of owners are equal to N . So as we
scale the economy by increasing the number of sectors, the number of people in the econ-
omy scales proportionally. The utility function of worker i is as in the additively separable











here, cni is the consumption of worker i in sector n, and θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitu-
tion indicating a preference for variety.26
25Our model does not account for the possibility of inter-firm technological spillovers due to investment.
López and Vives (2019) showed that, if spillovers are high enough, then increased common ownership may
boost R&D investment as well.
26The form of Ci is the one used by Allen and Arkolakis (2016). The weight (1/N)1/θ in Ci implies that, as
N grows, the indirect utility derived from Ci does not grow unboundedly and is consistent with a continuum
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For each product, there are J firms that can produce it using labor as input. The profits
of firm j in sector n are given by
πnj = pnF(Lnj)−wLnj;
here, the production function is F(Lnj)= ALαnj with A> 0 and α> 0.
The ownership structure is similar to the single-sector case, except that now (i) there are
J ×N groups of shareholders and (ii) shareholders can diversify both in an industry fund
and in an economy-wide fund. Group nj owns a fraction 1 −φ− φ̃≥ 0 in firm nj directly,
an industry index fund with a fraction φ̃/J in every firm in sector n, and an economy-
wide index fund with a fraction φ/NJ in every firm. The owners’ utility is simply their
consumption Ci of the composite good. Solving the owners’ utility maximization problem
yields the indirect utility function of shareholder i (i.e., V (Pw;Wi)=Wi/P) when prices






is the price index.
The objective function of the manager of firm j in sector n is to choose the firm’s level
of employment, Lnj , that maximizes a weighted average of shareholder (indirect) utilities.




















where the lambdas are a function of (φ φ̃ JN).
Thus the firm accounts for the effects of its actions not only on same-sector rivals but
also on firms in other sectors. Note that the manager’s objective function depends on
N + 1 relative prices—that is, on w/P in addition to {pn/P}Nn=1 for N > 1.
We can show that the Edgeworth sympathy coefficient for other firms in the same sector
as the focal firm is
λintra =
(2 −φ)φ+ [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N
(1 −φ)2JN + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N(J − 1)
and that the Edgeworth sympathy coefficient for firms in other sectors is given by
λinter = (2 −φ)φ
(1 −φ)2JN + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N(J − 1) 
Observe that λintra is no less than λinter. This follows because the former sums the profit
weights of both the industry fund and the economy-wide fund. We can show (see Lemma 2
in Appendix B) that λintra and λinter are always in [01], increasing in φ and φ̃, and—for
φ> 0 and φ+ φ̃ < 1—decreasing in N and J.
When φ + φ̃ = 1, we have λintra = 1 and λinter = (1 − φ̃2)/[1 + φ̃2(N − 1)]; as a result,
if agents are fully invested in the two index funds, then λintra = 1 regardless of the share
formulation for the sectors (replacing the summation with an integral) of unit mass. More precisely: if the
equilibrium is symmetric, then, regardless of N , the level of consumption Ci is equal to the consumer’s income
divided by the price.
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in each fund. In contrast, the sympathy λinter for firms in other sectors decreases as shares
are moved from the economy index fund to the own-industry index fund φ̃.27 Indeed, if
everything is invested in the industry fund, then φ̃ = 1, λintra = 1, and λinter = 0. If there is
no economy-wide index fund, then φ = 0, λinter = 0, and λintra = (2−φ̃)φ̃(1−φ̃)2J+(2−φ̃)φ̃ . If there are
no industry funds, then φ̃ = 0 and λintra = λinter = (2−φ)φ(1−φ)2JN+(2−φ)φ .28 Finally, if everything is
invested in the economy-wide index fund, then φ= 1 and λintra = λinter = 1.
4.2. Cournot–Walras Equilibrium With N Sectors
We start by characterizing the competitive equilibrium in terms of relative prices w/P
and of {pn/P}Nn=1, given the production plans of the J firms operating in the N sectors:
L ≡ {L1    LJ}, where Lj ≡ (L1j    LNj). Then we characterize the equilibrium in the
plans of the firms.
4.2.1. Relative Prices in a Competitive Equilibrium Given Firms’ Production Plans
Because the function that aggregates the consumption of all sectors is homothetic,
workers face a two-stage budgeting problem. First, workers choose their consumption
across sectors (conditional on their aggregate level of consumption) to minimize expen-
ditures; second, they choose labor supply Li and consumption level Ci to maximize their
utility U(CiLi) subject to the budget constraint PCi =wLi, where P is the price index.
















The solution to this problem yields the standard demand of consumer i for each product n








It follows from homotheticity that, for every consumer, total expenditures equal the price




27When φ + φ̃ = 1, two firms in the same industry have the same ownership structure, each with φ and φ̃
proportions of each fund. Therefore, there is shareholder unanimity in maximizing joint industry profits and
λintra = 1.
28In both cases, λ is given as in the one-sector economy: in the first case with φ̃ instead of φ, and in the
second with JN instead of J.
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Since workers are homogeneous, it follows that total labor supply
∫
i∈I Li di is simply
N times the individual labor supply Li; moreover, because total labor demand L must
equal total labor supply, equation (4.2) implicitly defines the equilibrium real wage (now
relative to the price of the composite good) as a function ω(L) of the firms’ total em-
ployment plans. We retain the assumptions for increasing labor supply that ensure ω′ > 0.
Then ω(L)= χ1/(1−σ)(L/N)1/η, where again η= (1 −σ)/(ξ+σ) is the elasticity of labor
supply.
Shareholders maximize their aggregate consumption level conditional on their income.
Their consumer demands, conditional on their respective levels of consumption, are iden-
tical to those of workers. Adding up the demands across owners and workers, we obtain
∫
i∈IW ∪IO









Ci di︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

In a competitive equilibrium, consumption demand must equal the sum of all firms’ pro-





Using equation (4.1) and integrating across consumers, we have that cn = 1N (pnP )−θC. So












The elasticity of the relative price of sector n, pn/P , with respect to the aggregate pro-
duction cn of the sector for given production in the other sectors (cm for m = n), when
evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, is −(1 − 1/N)/θ. Its absolute value is decreasing
in the elasticity of substitution of the varieties (θ) and increasing in the number of sec-
tors (N). Increasing cn has a direct negative impact on pn/P of −1/θ for a given C, and an
indirect positive impact on pn/P by increasing aggregate real income C, yielding 1/(θN).
When there is only one sector (N = 1), there is obviously no impact on the relative price.
Furthermore, the overall effect increases with the number N of sectors because then the
indirect effect is weaker.
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We can now use equations (4.3) and (4.4) to obtain an expression for ρn ≡ pn/P in a























Observe that—unlike the previous case of a real-wage function, where the dependence
was only through total employment plans—relative prices under a competitive equilib-
rium depend directly on the employment plans of each individual firm.
PROPOSITION 3: Given the production plans L ≡ {Lmj} of firms with aggregate labor de-
mand L, the competitive equilibrium is given by the real wage ω(L) and the relative prices
of the N sectors: ρn(L) for n = 1    N . If firm j in sector n expands its employment
plans, then ω increases; in addition, ρn decreases (∂ρn/∂Lnj < 0) while ρm, m = n, increases
(∂ρm/∂Lnj > 0).
An increase in employment by a firm in sector n increases the relative supply of the
consumption good of that sector relative to other sectors, thereby reducing the relative
price of the focal sector’s good. Since this increased employment increases overall supply
of the aggregate consumption good while leaving supply of the other sectors unchanged,
the relative prices of goods in those other sectors increase.
4.2.2. Cournot–Walras Equilibrium























where πnj/P = ρnF(Lnj)−ω(L)Lnj . The first-order condition for the firm is
ρn(L)F ′(Lnj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
VMPL









































(iii) other industries’ relative price effect
= 0
When a firm in a given sector considers hiring an additional worker, it faces the follow-
ing trade-offs. On the one hand, expanding employment increases profits by the value of
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the marginal product of labor (VMPL), which the shareholders can consume after paying
the new workers the real wage. On the other hand, expanding employment will increase
real wages for all workers because the labor supply is upward sloping. So when there is
common ownership, the owners will take into account the wage effect not just for the firm
that expands employment (or just for the firms in the same industry) but for all firms in all
industries. Furthermore, expanding employment will increase output in the firm’s sector
and thereby reduce that sector’s relative prices; as before, owners internalize that reduc-
tion not just for the firm itself but for all firms in the sector in which they have common
ownership. Finally, expanding output in the firm’s sector decreases consumption in all the
other sectors and thus increases their relative prices; the owners of the firm, if they have
common ownership involving other sectors, internalize these increased relative prices as
a positive pecuniary externality.
As we establish in Appendix B, a firm’s objective function is strictly concave if α ≤ 1.
We therefore have the following existence and characterization result.29
PROPOSITION 4: Consider a multi-sector economy with additive separable isoelastic pref-
erences and a Cobb–Douglas production function under non-increasing returns to scale








The equilibrium markdown of real wages is
μ∗ = 1 +Hlabor/η
1 − (Hproduct − λinter)(1 − 1/N)/θ − 1
where Hlabor ≡ (1+λintra(J−1)+λinter(N−1)J)/NJ is the modified HHI of the labor market
and Hproduct ≡ (1 + λintra(J − 1))/J is the modified HHI for each sector.
The markdown μ∗ decreases with J (for φ+ φ̃ < 1, with μ∗ → 0 as J → ∞), η, and θ (for
φ< 1); it increases with φ̃; and it can be non-monotone in φ.














REMARK: Simulations reveal that μ∗ may be non-monotone in φ also if φ̃ > 0. In fact,
we can show that if η is large enough, then μ∗ is decreasing in φ for φ̃ > 0 small and in-
creasing in φ for JN large. Furthermore, μ∗ is found to be either increasing or decreasing
in N .
In the multiple-industry case, we find that the equilibrium real wage, employment, and
output are analogous—as a function of the markdown—to those in the single-industry
case. The only difference is that the markdown is now more complicated owing to the ex-
istence of multiple sectors and of product differentiation across firms in different sectors.
29As in the one-sector case, if φ = 1 and α = 1, then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium and there also
exist asymmetric equilibria, since shareholders are indifferent to which firms employ the workers as long as
total employment is at the monopoly level.
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An important result that contrasts with the single-sector case is that employment, output,
and the real wage may all increase with diversification using the economy-wide fund φ.
Perfect Substitutes. As the elasticity of substitution (θ) tends to infinity, the products of
the different sectors become close to perfect substitutes; then the equilibrium is just as in
the one-industry case but with JN firms instead of J firms. This outcome should not be
surprising given that, in the case of perfect substitutes, all firms produce the same good
and so—for all intents and purposes—there is but a single industry in the economy.
The Two Wedges of the Markdown. The markdown of wages below the marginal prod-
uct of labor can be viewed as consisting of two “wedges,” one reflecting labor market
power and one reflecting product market power. In particular, the labor market wedge
is 1 + Hlabor/η. The markdown is increasing in Hlabor/η, which reflects the level of labor
market power (and so decreases with JN and η). The product market wedge is (Hproduct −
λinter)(1 − 1/N)/θ. This wedge has two components: the first is Hproduct(1 − 1/N)/θ, re-
flecting the level of market power in the firm’s sector; the second is λinter(1 − 1/N)/θ, re-
flecting the inter-sectoral externality (note that the latter diminishes as products become
more substitutable and θ increases). The markdown is increasing in the first component
of the product market wedge, and decreasing in the second component.30
From the previous paragraph, it follows that μ∗ is positively associated with λintra be-
cause so also are both the labor and product wedges—that is, since Hlabor and Hproduct are
increasing in λintra. However, μ∗ may be positively or negatively associated with λinter be-
cause, when λinter > 0, we must account for the effect of expanding employment (by firm j
in sector n) on the profits of other firms. Expanding employment in one sector benefits
firms in other sectors by increasing the relative prices in those sectors (pecuniary external-
ity) via the increase in overall consumption generated by firm nj’s expanded employment
plans. The result is that Hproduct is then reduced by λinter (note that Hproduct ≥ λinter always).
If an increase in λinter increases the labor market wedge more than it reduces the product
market wedge, then μ∗ is decreasing in λinter; the converse of this statement holds as well.
Case With No Industry Fund. When φ̃ = 0, we have λintra = λinter = λ; then the net ef-
fect of an increase in λ (due to an increase in φ) will be to diminish the product market
wedge. To see this, note that (Hproduct − λ)(1 − 1/N)/θ = (1 − λ)(1 − 1/N)/(θJ). In the
limit, when φ = 1 and λ = 1, we have a cartel or a monopoly and the two product mar-
ket effects cancel each other out exactly.31 It is worth noting that μ∗ may either increase
or decrease with portfolio diversification φ depending on whether labor market effects
or rather product market effects prevail. The markdown will be decreasing in φ when
the increase in the labor market wedge (due to the higher φ) is more than compensated
by the lower product market wedge (due to the pro-competitive inter-sectoral pecuniary
externality)—in other words, when the effect of profit internalization on the level of mar-
ket power in product markets is higher than it is in the labor market. This happens when
the elasticity of substitution θ is small in relation to the elasticity of labor supply η. When
η → ∞, common ownership always has a pro-competitive effect. If N is large, then the
30Recall that, when evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, the (absolute value of the) elasticity of “inverse
demand” pn/P with respect to cn is (1 − 1/N)/θ; this explains why Hproduct(1 − 1/N)/θ is the indicator of
product market power (note that this indicator decreases with J and θ but increases with N).
31When portfolios are perfectly diversified (φ= 1), the economy can be viewed as consisting of a single large
firm that produces the composite good. Since the owner-consumers own shares in each of the components of
the composite good in the same proportion and since they use profits only to purchase that good, these owner-
consumers are to the same extent shareholders and consumers of the composite good. So just as in the single-
sector economy, the effects cancel out exactly. The N = 1 case is the one-sector model developed in Section 3.
Here λ= 1 can be understood in similar terms except that, in this case, there is an aggregate good C .
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OLIGOPOLY AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 1023
anti-competitive effect of common ownership prevails provided that η< 1. This outcome














Under the parameter configurations for the elasticities considered in Azar and Vives
(2019a), θ = 3 and with a conservative η = 06, we have that θ1+η > 12 . In consequence,
the anti-competitive effect will prevail for N large.
4.3. Large Economies
Most of the literature on oligopoly in general equilibrium considers the case of an in-
finite number of sectors such that each sector, and therefore each firm, is small relative
to the economy. Monopolistic competition can be viewed as a special case of a model
with infinite sectors in which there is only one firm per industry. Here we consider what
happens when the number of sectors, N , tends to infinity. Our aim is to identify the con-
ditions under which the monopolistically competitive limit is obtained (as in Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977)). We consider the following cases where owners: (i) hold fully diversified
portfolios, (ii) are not diversified, (iii) are fully diversified only intra-industry for N large,
and (iv) are fully diversified for N large.
4.3.1. Case 1: Full Diversification (φ = 1 φ̃= 0)
When all the owner-consumers hold market portfolios, λintra(N) = λinter(N) = 1. This
means that we have a sequence of economies with an increasing number of sectors and
firms but in which the equilibrium outcome remains the same. The product market wedge
disappears because the owner-consumers fully internalize the effect of firms’ decisions on
themselves as consumers. As with the one-sector model, the labor market wedge remains
at the monopsony level—here, because owner-consumers still have an incentive to reduce
the real wages of worker-consumers. We remark that, if the model had a representative
agent rather than owner-consumers and worker-consumers, then the labor market wedge
would also disappear and the equilibrium would be efficient.
4.3.2. Case 2: No Diversification (φ= φ̃ = 0)
Consider now the case in which owner-consumers hold shares in only one firm. In this
case, as the number of sectors tends to infinity, the labor market wedge disappears as
the number of firms interacting in the labor market goes to infinity (this result would not
hold if the labor markets were segmented, for example, by industry). With J > 1 firms,
the limit economy is equivalent to that of Neary (2003b): a continuum of sectors, no labor
market power, and a homogeneous-goods Cournot equilibrium in each sector (if goods
were heterogeneous within sector, then the limit economy would be equivalent to that
of Atkeson and Burstein (2008)). In the case of J = 1, the limit economy in this case is
equivalent to that of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition model.
One must bear in mind, however, that obtaining these economies as a limit in the model
requires heterogeneous agents: owner-consumers and worker-consumers; also, within the
owner-consumers, there must be different groups with each group having ownership in
just one firm. If, as in Neary (2003b), Atkeson and Burstein (2008), and Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), we assumed a representative agent: (a) there would be fully diversified owner-
worker-consumers; and (b) the equilibrium of the economy at each point in the sequence
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of economies would be efficient, with price equal to marginal cost. Even though the mod-
els in these papers assume profit maximization, no shareholder would actually want the
firms to maximize profits. This tension was discussed in Section 2.
4.3.3. Case 3: Only Intra-Industry Asymptotic Diversification (φ= 0 φ̃N → φ̃ > 0)
When φ = 0, oligopsony power vanishes in the limit because (again) the number of
firms competing in the labor market goes to infinity and there is no inter-industry in-
ternalization effect (λinter(N) = 0). Thus, the limit economy is equivalent to that of Neary
(2003b) but with horizontal, within-industry common ownership. In this case, for any N
we have the same formula as for the one-sector model except with φ̃N instead of φ:
λintra(N) = (2 − φ̃N)φ̃N
(1 − φ̃N)2J + (2 − φ̃N)φ̃N

Here the markdown
μ∗N → μ∗∞ =
1
1 −Hproduct(∞)/θ − 1
increases with φ̃ when J > 1 (in this formula, Hproduct(∞) refers to the limit product market
modified HHI, which is 1/J + λintra(∞)(1 − 1/J)). If φ̃ = 1, then Hproduct(∞) = 1 and μ∗∞ =
1/(θ− 1).
Recall that the market power friction at a symmetric equilibrium can also be expressed






rather than in terms of the markdown. We have that μ̃∗ → 1/θ (the monopolistic compe-
tition markup of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) when there is essentially one firm per sector
(either J = 1 or λintra(∞) = 1; e.g., φ̃ → 1).32
4.3.4. Case 4: Full Asymptotic Diversification (φN → 1 φ̃= 0)
We consider now the case with full asymptotic diversification (φN → 1). For simplicity,
we assume no industry fund: φ̃ = 0, where λintra(N) = λinter(N) = λN = (2−φN)φN(1−φN)2JN+(2−φN)φN . We
start by observing that, if φN → φ < 1, then λN → 0. This is so because, as the number
of sectors in the economy increases: for a shareholder in group nj, the fraction held in
each of the other firms (when φ is constant) is φ/(NJ), which goes to zero, while the
fraction 1 − φ + φ/(NJ) held in firm nj does not. In this case, then, the equilibrium of
32Similar results are obtained with some economy-wide diversification. Suppose φ< 1 and φ̃ > 0 are fixed;
then, as N → ∞, we have that λinter → 0 (and oligopsony power vanishes, since Hlabor → λinter(∞) = 0) but that
λintra → λintra(∞) ≡ 2γ − 1
γ2J − (2γ − 1)(J − 1) 
where γ ≡ (1 − φ)/φ̃ > 0 is the ratio of undiversified investment to investment in the industry fund. The
parameter γ ranges from 1 to infinity: γ = 1 when 1 − φ = φ̃ (e.g., as when φ̃ = 1); and γ → ∞ as φ̃ → 0. If
γ = 1, then λintra(∞) = 1, and if γ → ∞, then λintra(∞) = 0.
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the limit economy is like the one in Case 2 (no diversification); hence it is equivalent to
Neary (2003b) when J > 1 and to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) when J = 1.
Consider now the case when φN → 1, or, equivalently, 1 − φN → 0. In that case,
the limit lambdas can take values between zero and 1, depending on the speed of con-
vergence. In particular, to have λN → λ ∈ (01], we need the sequence 1 − φN to ap-




N(1 − φN) → k for
k ∈ [0∞)). If the convergence rate is faster than 1/√N with k = 0, then the limiting λ
is always equal to 1, and the equilibrium in the limit economy is the same as in Case 1
(full diversification). If the convergence rate is slower than 1/
√
N , then the limiting λ
is equal to zero, and the equilibrium in the limit economy is the same as in Case 2 (no
diversification).
For sequences 1−φN with convergence rates equal to 1/
√
N , the value of λ in the limit
is determined by k, the constant of convergence: if
√
N(1 −φN)→ k, then limN→∞ λN =





1 − (1 − λ∞)/(θJ) − 1
The impact of λ∞ on the markdown depends, as before, on whether (or not) its effect
on the labor market wedge effect dominates its effect on the product market wedge. The
labor market wedge effect dominates the product market wedge effect if and only if the
elasticity η of labor supply is lower than θJ − 1. These results are summarized in our next
proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: Consider a sequence of economies (φ̃NφNN), where φ̃N = 0 for all
N but attaining full diversification as φN → 1. If
√
N(1 − φN) → k for k ∈ [0∞), then,
as N → ∞, we have λN → 1/(1 + Jk2)—which is increasing in concentration 1/J and
in the speed of convergence of φN → 1 as measured by the constant 1/k. The limit mark-
down is μ∗∞ = (1 + λ∞/η)/(1 − (1 − λ∞)/(θJ))− 1, which is increasing in λ∞ if and only if
θ/(1 +η) > 1/J or θJ − 1 >η.
That is to say: if full diversification is attained at least as fast as 1/
√
N as the econ-
omy grows large, then profit internalization is (a) positive in the limit and (b) increasing
both in concentration and in how rapidly diversification is achieved. The limit markdown
increases with profit internalization if and only if θ/(1 +η) > 1/J.
Only when λ∞ = 0 do we obtain the markdown associated with the Dixit–Stiglitz or
Neary μ∗∞ = 1/(Jθ − 1). When λ∞ > 0, however, we obtain a different limit. In this case,
if J → ∞, then there is no product market power and so the markdown λ∞/η (i) is due
only to labor market power and (ii) increases with λ∞. When η → ∞, the labor market is
competitive and the markdown is decreasing in λ∞. Finally, if λ∞ = 1, then we obtain the
monopsony solution μ∗∞ = 1/η.
33This result follows from the expression for λN by noting that (1 − φN)2N is of order k2 and that
φN → 1 as N → ∞. Note that the limit sympathy coefficient λ is increasing in market concentration 1/J
and also in the speed of convergence of φN → 1, as measured by the constant 1/k. When diversification
increases faster (k smaller), profit internalization is larger. So in order for λ to be positive, the limiting
portfolio must be fully diversified: φN → 1. Indeed, if φN = 1 for all N , then also λN = 1 for all N . If
φN = 1 −
√
(1 − λ)/(λJN + (1 − λ)), then λ is constant for all N .
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FIGURE 2.—Average intra- and inter-sector Edgeworth sympathy coefficients for the largest 1500 firms by
market capitalization. Source: Authors’ calculations using Thomson–Reuters 13F filings data on institutional
ownership.
4.4. Calibration
The model is parsimonious enough that it can be calibrated with only a few parameters.
In the U.S. economy and under our maintained assumption of proportional control, the
weights that managers put on rivals’ profits (i.e., the lambdas) have increased dramatically
over the past decades. In the United States, for example, the 1500 largest firms (by mar-
ket capitalization) nearly doubled their calibrated average intra-industry lambdas: from
about 0.41 in 1985 to about 0.72 in 2017 (see Figure 2). We adjust these lambdas down-
ward in our calibration to account for privately held firms (which we assume have no
common ownership) representing 58.7% of sales in the economy (Asker, Farre-Mensa,
and Ljungqvist (2014)). The result is an increase, in average intra-industry lambdas, from
0.07 in 1985 to 0.124 in 2017 (and a similar increase for inter-industry lambdas). This
increase in lambdas implies an increase in markups (p/mc) from 1.49 to 1.61 over the
period 1985–2017. That increase is smaller than the one estimated by De Loecker, Eeck-
hout, and Unger (2020) (from about 1.3 in the mid-1980s to 1.61 in 2016) and Hall (2018)
(from 1.12 in 1988 to 1.38 in 2015), and it is smaller also than that implied by the cali-
bration in Backus, Conlon, and Sinkinson (2019) based on a Bertrand competition model
(which goes from about 1.21 in 1980 to about 1.56 in 2017). However, the increase we
estimate is similar to the increase in markups measured by Nekarda and Ramey (2019):
their markup index increases from about 90 to about 100 over 1985–2017—nearly an 11%
increase, which is roughly comparable to the 8.5% increase implied by our model. Also,
the decline in the labor share implied by our model is similar to the decline measured by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS; see Azar and Vives (2019a)).
The model has been extended in Azar and Vives (2019a) to include savings and capital,
and shown able to reproduce macroeconomic trends such as the secular decline in the
U.S. economy’s labor share, and also approximate the decline in the capital share. The
key to their approximation is using the evolution of effective (i.e., including the influence
of common ownership) concentration in product and labor markets, thereby combining
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market power in product and labor markets with the evolution of common ownership.34
With this we do not claim that common ownership is the cause of the evolution of markups
and markdowns and of the decline of labor and capital shares, but only that it has the
potential to explain it.
The question arises as to what explains observed increases in the lambdas. Banal-
Estañol, Seldeslachts, and Vives (2018) examined 2004–2012 data for all publicly listed
firms in the United States and documented that passive investors increased their holdings
relative to active shareholders after the financial crisis. This need not lead necessarily to a
higher degree of internalization of rivals’ profits, since passive investors could (in princi-
ple) exert less control than active ones. However, passive shareholders are more diversi-
fied, and the shift toward passive investors does help explain (statistically) the increase in
profit internalization. The authors also reported, for a cross-section of industries, a posi-
tive association between increases in the intra-industry lambda and increasing markups.
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) also calibrated a model of oligopoly in general equilib-
rium. Our calibrations are similar along some dimensions but differ along others. These
authors calibrated higher product market power parameters,35 but the two quantitative
models differ substantially since we consider labor market power and common ownership
whereas they do not.36 We have already mentioned that, although firms in their model are
under full common ownership (by the representative household that owns all firms), those
firms are still assumed to maximize profits. In our calibration, common ownership is only
partial, but it is taken into account by the firms, reducing the effective number of firms
to 3.2 in the product market and to 3.3 in the labor market in 2017 (the corresponding
numbers for 1985 are 4.5 and 4.2). In addition, common ownership in our model implies
a pro-competitive internalization of the inter-sectoral externality.37 Overall, these differ-
ences imply that, in our model, the (p − c)/p markup (including the labor and product
market wedges) increases from 33% to 38% over the 1985–2017 period—as compared
with the markup of 29% calculated by Atkeson and Burstein (2008) (even though their
product market markup is much higher than our product market wedge).38
34We do not need to assume symmetric firms for the simulation since we can input the modified HHI for an
asymmetric market structure. Indeed, an industry with a very uneven distribution of firms’ market shares may
have a high HHI even with a large number of firms.
35For the inter-sectoral elasticity of substitution, we set θ = 3 based on estimates by Hobijn and Nechio
(2015); in contrast, Atkeson and Burstein (2008) used a value of 1.01 “to keep sectoral expenditure shares
roughly constant.” Hence their calibration implies a much lower market-level elasticity of demand and thus
the potential of far more market power in the product market. Since we assume that goods within a sector are
homogeneous, our calibration of the intra-sector elasticity of substitution parameter is that it is infinite, while
they calibrated it to 10, which is a large number, but still implying some differentiation and therefore more
product market power than in our model. Their assumptions imply an effective number of firms equal to 6.7 in
the product market, whereas we calculate that number to decline from 6.1 to 4.6 over the period 1985–2017.
36Atkeson and Burstein (2008) assumed that firms are price takers in the labor market, whereas we assume
that they have market power in the labor market. In particular, for the calibration we assume that labor markets
are segmented by industry and that (based on estimates by Chetty et al. (2011)) the market-level elasticity of
labor supply is 0.59. Our labor market HHI increases from 1798 to 1965 over 1985–2017 (i.e., the effective
number of firms declines from 5.6 to 5).
37The internalization of the externality does not disappear when the number of firms tends to infinity when
firms are owned by a representative household owning the market portfolio, and therefore it still exists in a
model with a continuum of firms.
38Finally, we remark that their model assumes constant returns in labor whereas we (a) assume decreasing
returns and (b) calibrate the associated function parameter so that our calibrated model’s labor share matches
the BLS labor share in the year 1985.
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5. COMPETITION POLICY
In this section, we show how equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic economies are sub-
optimal from a social welfare perspective before considering the potentially beneficial
effects of competition policies. Our model is static and should therefore be interpreted
as capturing only long-run phenomena. In this model, then, the low levels of output and
employment are of a long-run nature and so could be affected by fiscal policy but not by
monetary policy.39
Competition policy (broadly understood to encompass regulation) can influence aggre-
gate outcomes by directly affecting product and labor market concentration—that is, by
affecting the number of firms and also the extent of their ownership overlap.40 We illus-
trate the analysis with the one-sector model Cobb–Douglas isoelastic specification. We
explore in turn the social planner allocation (first best) and competition policy (second
best); we then conclude with some remarks on the multi-sector model.
5.1. Social Planner’s Solution in the One-Sector Model
Here we characterize—in the one-sector, Cobb–Douglas, additively separable, isoelas-
tic model—the allocation that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner who maxi-
mizes a weighted sum of the utilities of all owner-consumers with weight κ ∈ [01] and of
all worker-consumers with weight 1 − κ.41 We assume that the social planner can choose
the allocation of labor and consumption as well as the number of firms (with access to
a large number Jmax). Let (CL) be the consumption and labor supply of a representa-
tive worker, and let CO be the consumption of a representative owner; then the social
planner’s problem is constrained by C +CO ≤ JA(L/J)α =ALα(1/J)α−1. This constraint
will always hold, since otherwise it would be possible to increase welfare by increasing











This problem can be solved in two steps. First, we choose the welfare-maximizing C and
L conditional on the number J of firms that are used (symmetrically) in production. Sec-
ond, we maximize over J to obtain the optimal number of firms from the social planner’s
perspective.
The first-order conditions (which are sufficient under non-increasing returns to scale)
for the first maximization problem ensure that, in an interior solution, (i) the marginal
utility C−σ of workers’ consumption is equal to κ/(1 − κ) multiplied by the owners’
marginal utility of consumption (which is constant and equals 1) and (ii) C−σ is equal
also to the marginal disutility from working divided by the marginal product of labor:
39The effects of government employment policies are examined in Azar and Vives (2019b).
40We do not consider here conduct regulation to limit markdowns and markups under a free entry constraint
(see, e.g., Vives (1999), Section 6). Note, however, that conduct regulation is approximated here by controlling
common ownership because of its direct link with margins.
41One can interpret κ as determining the welfare standard used by society. Thus κ = 0 represents the
case of a “worker-consumer welfare standard” in which owners’ utilities are assigned zero weight; this case
is analogous—in our general equilibrium oligopoly model—to that of the usual partial equilibrium consumer
welfare standard. The case κ = 1/2 corresponds to a “total welfare standard” in which all agents’ utilities are
equally weighted.
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χLξ/(Aα(L/J)α−1).42 This condition cannot hold in an oligopsonistic equilibrium be-
cause the markdown of wages relative to the marginal product of labor is positive, which
introduces a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the real wage.
How many firms will the social planner choose to involve in the production process?
If there are decreasing returns to scale, then social benefits are increasing in J and so the
optimal choice is Jmax. With constant returns to scale, the number of firms in operation
is irrelevant. Under increasing returns to scale, the social planner would choose to pro-
duce using only one firm; however, the planner would still set—contra the monopsonistic
outcome—the marginal product of labor equal to the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and labor.43 Thus, from the viewpoint of a social planner, there is no
Williamson trade-off because the planner can set the “shadow” markdown to zero and
still benefit fully from the economies of scale due to producing with only one firm. Next,
we address the second-best allocation, under which the planner can affect the oligopoly
equilibrium only by controlling the variables J and φ.
5.2. Competition Policy
The models developed so far illustrate how the level of competition in the economy has
macroeconomic consequences, from which it seems reasonable to conclude that compe-
tition policy may stimulate the economy by boosting output and inducing a more egali-
tarian distribution of income. We showed that if returns to scale are non-increasing, then
employment, output, real wages, and the labor share all decrease under higher market
concentration and more common ownership.
In the one-sector case, the equilibrium modified HHI (H) is the same for the product
and labor markets and is proportional to the markdown of wages relative to the marginal
product of labor in the economy. In the multi-sector case, the markdown is a function
of both the within-industry and the economy-wide modified HHIs, of which the latter
is most relevant for the labor market. (In practice, labor markets are segmented and so
the labor market modified HHI would differ from the economy-wide one; however, the
insight would be similar.)
5.2.1. Worker-Consumer Welfare
We can view the competition policy in our model as setting a policy environment that
affects—in a symmetric equilibrium—the number of firms per industry and/or the extent
of common ownership. We start by showing that 1 − φ and J are complements as policy
tools. Then common ownership mitigates the effect of “traditional” competition policy on
employment because increasing the number of firms has less of an effect on concentration
when firms’ shareholders are more similar.
PROPOSITION 6: Let α < 1 + 1/η and let L∗ be a symmetric equilibrium. Then reducing
common ownership (increasing 1 − φ) and reducing concentration (increasing J) are com-
plements as policy tools for increasing equilibrium employment.
42However, it is possible—for sufficiently low values of κ—for there to be a corner solution such that all the
output is assigned to the workers and the consumption of the owners is zero; that is, C =ALα and CO = 0.
43With increasing returns to scale, and α < 1 + ξ, the objective of the social planner is convex in L below
a threshold, and concave in L above that threshold. This guarantees that the optimal L is strictly positive
(however, just like in the non-increasing returns case, there can be a corner solution for the consumption of
the workers and the owners, that is, C =ALα and CO = 0). If α> 1 + ξ, in some cases there could be a corner
solution with L= 0.
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for J > 1, η< ∞, and ∂λ
∂(1−φ) < 0. We remark that this proposition holds under decreasing
returns and also in our increasing returns example (see Appendix A) with η ≤ 1 and
α ∈ (12).
Under either constant or decreasing returns to scale, it is always welfare-increasing
for worker-consumers if the planner’s policy reduces diversification (common ownership)
and increases the number of firms—although the latter claim need not apply under in-
creasing returns. Under non-increasing returns, the result follows because L∗ increases
with both 1 − φ and J, equilibrium real wages increase with employment, and worker-
consumer utility increases with real wages. Under increasing returns, however, there is a
trade-off between market power and efficiency; in this scenario, the optimal number of
firms (from the perspective of worker-consumer welfare) is limited.44 In short: if returns
to scale are increasing, then a decrease in the equilibrium markdown does not always
translate into an increase in worker-consumer welfare. When returns are non-increasing,
however, competition policy can lead to equilibria that are arbitrarily close to the social
planner’s as Jmax becomes large. This is because the markdown then becomes arbitrarily
close to zero.
Entry. Until now, we have assumed that the number of firms is fixed. We could consider
an extension of the model whereby a large number of groups of potential owners can
create new firms by paying a fixed cost. Once a new firm is created, its shares can be
traded on the stock market. If we assume that the group creating the firm must retain a
fraction 1 −φ of the firm’s shares yet can also exchange up to φ of their shares for shares
in the index, then we can easily re-create our model as a post-entry stage during which
entry decisions depend on the entrant’s expected profitability. In this world, common
ownership will tend to magnify the excess entry results that hold in a Cournot market
(see, e.g., Vives (1999)) although, according to some preliminary results, it will lead to
decreased output and depressed wages as φ increases, only punctuated by upward jumps
when a new firm enters.
5.2.2. Positive Weight on Owner-Consumer Welfare
The polar case of κ = 1, when the social planner maximizes the utility of the owner-
consumers only, can easily be seen to imply—if we assume η ≤ 1—that setting φ = 1
will result in a completely concentrated economy in terms of the modified HHI, while
choosing the number of firms to produce as efficiently as possible, which implies setting
J = Jmax in the case of decreasing returns, J = 1 in the case of increasing returns, and any
J ∈ {1     Jmax} in the case of constant returns. For intermediate values of κ, there is no
simple analytic solution to the problem of choosing a competition policy that maximizes
social welfare. Yet we do know that, as κ increases, owner-consumer welfare increases
while worker-consumer welfare declines; the implication is that equilibrium employment
and wages are both lower when κ is higher. Azar and Vives (2018) simulated the opti-
mal policy as a function of κ; they found that, with decreasing returns to scale, φ weakly
44One can easily check that, for α ∈ (12) and η ≤ 1, the total employment level L∗ increases with 1 − φ
and peaks for J (when considered as a continuous variable) at η−1(2 − α)/(α− 1). If J > η−1(2 − α)/(α− 1),
then α− 1 > (ηJ)−1(1 + (ηJ)−1)−1 and the equilibrium would be unstable (see Appendix A).
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increases to 1 as κ tends to 1, and owner-consumer’s welfare weakly increases, and em-
ployment and worker welfare weakly decrease, with κ.45
5.2.3. Heterogeneous Firms
Suppose firms have heterogeneous CRS technologies. Then, by Proposition 2(b), it is
optimal to set φ = 0 if the aim is to maximize employment. Now suppose that the least ef-
ficient firm exits the market; then average productivity of the remaining firms will increase
but total output and hired labor may decline. This is what happens with a constant elastic-
ity of labor supply.46 Although removing the least productive firm reduces worker welfare,
total welfare (including both worker-consumer and owner-consumer welfare) can either
increase or decrease.
As an example, consider an economy with two firms and parameters σ = 1/3, ξ = 1/3,
χ = 1, and A1 = 1. Suppose the common ownership parameter is φ = 3/4 (yielding λ =
05172) and that the social welfare function parameter κ is 1/2. In that case, if A2 = 08
(i.e., if firm 2 is 80% as productive as firm 1), then removing firm 2 increases total welfare;
whereas if A2 = 09, then removing firm 2 reduces total welfare. If φ = 1/8 (such that
λ = 01064), then removing firm 2 increases total welfare if A2 = 06 but reduces it if
A2 = 09. Dropping one firm will be the outcome of a merger to monopoly, which owners
will always favor despite the possibility of its reducing total welfare.
5.2.4. Competition Policy With Multiple Sectors
In the one-sector case with the worker-consumer welfare standard (κ = 0), it is always
efficient to force completely separate ownership of firms, regardless of how many firms
there are, because there are no efficiencies associated with common ownership. In the
multi-sector case, however, common ownership is associated with internalization of de-
mand effects in other sectors; this means that—depending on the elasticity of substitution,
the elasticity of labor supply, and the number of firms per industry—worker-consumers
could be better-off under complete indexation of the economy. In any case, if maximizing
employment is the goal, then it is better to set the intra-industry index fund ownership
to zero (i.e., φ̃ = 0), and, if returns to scale are decreasing, produce with the maximum
number Jmax of firms. Along these lines, what follows can be viewed as a corollary of our
previous results.
In short, with N sectors and non-increasing returns to scale, employment, real wages, and
the welfare of worker-consumers are maximized when J = Jmax, φ̃ = 0, and when φ = 0
(resp., φ = 1) if θ(Jmax − 1/N) > (1 + η)(1 − 1/N) (resp., if inequality is reversed). So if
the product market wedge effect dominates the labor market wedge effect (i.e., low θ
and high η), then allowing full economy-wide common ownership increases equilibrium
employment. Conversely, if the labor market wedge effect dominates the product market
wedge effect, then the optimal policy, as in the one-sector case, is no common ownership.
For large economies, the following analogous result holds. There exists an N̂ such that,
for economies with N > N̂ , maximizing employment requires that the planner: (i) set
φ̃ = 0 and J = Jmax; and (ii) set φ = 0 if θJ − 1 >η but φ = 1 if θJ − 1 <η.47
45With increasing returns to scale, it is easy to generate examples where it is optimal—even from the worker-
consumers’ standpoint, κ = 0—if some market power is allowed so as to exploit economies of scale. Typically,
the number of firms declines as κ increases.
46Proof available on request.
47Even under Neary’s (2003b) assumption of no common ownership, competition policy has an effect when
firms across all sectors employ the same CRS technology. This result follows because, in our model, the supply
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6. CONCLUSION
We have provided a tractable model of oligopoly in general equilibrium that accom-
modates the influence of ownership structure. By assuming that managers maximize a
weighted sum of utilities of shareholders in a firm, we identify a numéraire-free Cournot–
Walras equilibrium and characterize it. In our model, firms’ employment decisions affect
prices in both product and factor markets. We find that a higher effective market con-
centration, which accounts for portfolio diversification and common ownership, increases
markups and reduces both real wages and employment. Furthermore, when firms have
heterogeneous CRS technologies, an increase in common ownership tilts the scales in
favor of more efficient (superstar) firms and raises market concentration. When there
are multiple industries, common ownership can have a positive or negative effect on the
equilibrium markup: the sign of the effect depends on the relative magnitudes of the elas-
ticities of product substitution and of labor supply. We find also that the monopolistically
competitive limit (as in, e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) or the oligopolistic one (Neary
(2003a, 2003b), Atkeson and Burstein (2008)) may or may not be attained as the number
of sectors in the economy grows large depending on the parallel evolution of diversifica-
tion.
Competition policy can increase employment and improve welfare. In the one-sector
economy, we find that controlling common ownership and reducing concentration are
complements in terms of fostering employment. With multiple sectors, to foster employ-
ment, traditional competition policy on market concentration is adequate. However, com-
mon ownership can have a positive or negative effect on employment. Although its effect
is negative in the intra-industry case, it could be positive in the case of economy-wide
common ownership.
Some caveats to our results follow from considering vertical relations between firms,
and possibly different patterns of consumption between owners and workers. For exam-
ple, vertical relations imply that products of one sector may serve as inputs for another
sector. Then common ownership may lead to partial internalization of double marginal-
ization and decrease markups.48
In general, our results indicate a need to go beyond traditional partial equilibrium anal-
yses of competition policy, where consumer surplus is king. However, traditional competi-
tion policy (e.g., lowering market concentration) remains a valid approach—as is limiting
intra-industry ownership. That said, policy regarding economy-wide common ownership
requires a more nuanced approach.
The models presented here are extremely stylized. We do not consider asymmetries in
ownership structure across firms. Because the ownership structure is exogenous, with a
separation between owners and workers, we consider neither the benefits of diversifica-
tion in an uncertain world nor the effects of unions’ market power on the labor market.
The models considered are static; dynamic versions incorporating uncertainty and ad-
justment costs may shed light on how oligopoly affects such issues as monetary policy
transmission. In other words, there is ample room in future research for extensions and
generalizations of our approach.
of labor is elastic (and so changes in the real wage affect both employment and output) and there are two types
of agents. If our model included only worker-owner-consumers, then the representative agent would always
choose the optimal level of employment.
48Azar (2012) found that common ownership links across industries are associated with lower markups.
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APPENDIX A: INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE
If α> 1, then neither the inequality −F ′′ +(1−λ)ω′ > 0 nor the payoff global concavity
condition need hold. We characterize the situation where α ∈ (12) and η ≤ 1. Then, with
respect to Lj , firm j’s objective function has a convex region below a certain threshold and
a concave region above that threshold. Hence we conclude that there are no more than
two candidate maxima for Lj , when given the other firms’ decisions, at a symmetric equilib-
rium: Lj = 0; and the critical point in the concave region (if there is any). We identify (af-
ter some work) the following necessary and sufficient condition for the candidate interior
solution to be a symmetric equilibrium: α≤ (1+H/η){1+λ(J−1)[1− (1−1/J)1/η]}−1.49
For small λ, if an equilibrium exists, then it is stable. Here L∗ is decreasing in φ, but it








(1 − λ) H/η
1 +H/η︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markdown effect
− (α− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Economies of scale effect
)

Increasing the number of firms has two effects on a symmetric equilibrium with increas-
ing returns to scale: a positive effect from fewer markdowns, and a negative effect from
reduced economies of scale. Thus, a merger between two firms (decreasing J) would in-
volve a so-called Williamson trade-off between higher market power and the efficiencies
stemming from a larger scale of production. In our example, a merger would increase
equilibrium employment if α were high enough to dominate the markdown effect.
A higher MHHI (the H in our formulation) makes it more difficult for the scale effect
to dominate. Yet for a given H, a higher internalization λ makes it easier for that effect
to dominate because if λ is high enough, then firms will act jointly irrespective of their
total number J. In fact, if they act fully as one firm (λ = 1), then the condition is always
fulfilled. Thus, reducing J improves scale but does not affect the markdown because it
is already at the monopoly level. It is easy to generate examples where, under increasing
returns, there are multiple equilibria and some firms do not produce.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: The objective of firm j’s manager is to maximize







The first derivative ∂ζ/∂Lj is given by F ′ −ω−ω′(Lj +λ∑k =j Lk), so the best response
of firm j depends only on
∑









ω′′ = −ω′(1 + λ)− (sj + λs−j)ω′′L
where sj ≡Lj/L and s−j ≡∑k =j Lk/L. If Eω′ ≡ −ω′′L/ω′ < 1, then the cross-derivative is
negative because sj + λs−j ≤ 1 and
−(1 + λ)− (sj + λs−j)ω′′L/ω′ <−(1 + λ)+ (sj + λs−j) < −λ
49The symmetric equilibrium is locally stable under continuous adjustment provided that α − 1 ≤ (1 −
λ)(Jη)−1(1 +H/η)−1.
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In this case, Theorem 2.7 of Vives (1999) guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
The second derivative ∂2ζ/(∂Lj)2 equals F ′′ −2ω′ − (Lj +λ∑k =j Lk)ω′′, and it is negative

























If the second-order condition holds, then R′ > −1 whenever −F ′′ + (1 − λ)ω′ > 0 and,
indeed, whenever F ′′ ≤ 0 (except if F ′ = 0 and λ = 1). When R′ > −1, Theorem 2.8 in
Vives (1999) guarantees that the equilibrium is unique.
Since Eω′ < 1 and F ′′ ≤ 0, it follows that ∂2ζ/(∂Lj)2 < 0 and ∂2ζ/∂Lj∂Lk < 0 for
k = j. Then the equilibrium is locally stable under continuous adjustment dynamics if
∂2ζ/(∂Lj)
2 < ∂2ζ/∂Lj∂Lk (see, e.g., Dixit (1986)). This inequality holds provided that
F ′′ < (1 − λ)ω′, which is true if F ′′ < 0 or if F ′′ ≤ 0 and λ < 1.
(a) From the first-order condition we have that, in a symmetric equilibrium, sj = 1/J






























is nonnegative if ∂L
∂λ





< 0. We show in part (b) of this proof that ∂L
∂λ
< 0.
(b) The symmetric equilibrium is given by the fixed point of L−j/(J−1)=R(L−j). Total
employment is L = L−j + R(L−j), which is increasing in L−j because R′ > −1. Further-
more, R is decreasing in λ because the objective function’s first derivative is decreasing
in λ. This implies that L−j—and hence also that L and ω(L) are decreasing in λ (and
in φ). We have in addition that L−j is increasing in J since R′ < 0 and since R is itself
increasing in J (i.e., because R is decreasing in λ and λ is decreasing in J). Therefore, in
equilibrium, L and ω(L) increase with J.
(c) The labor share is ω(L)L
JF(L/J)






given that returns to scale are non-increasing, F(L/J) − (L/J)F ′(L/J) ≥ 0.50 Since em-
ployment is decreasing in φ, that implies the labor share is decreasing in φ as well. Q.E.D.
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of Proposition 2.
50If F(x) is increasing and concave for x≥ 0 with F(0) ≥ 0, then F(x)/x ≥ F ′(x).
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LEMMA 1: Suppose Eω′ < 1 and that firms have (possibly heterogeneous) CRS production
functions. Then, in equilibrium, ∂η
∂λ
+ 1 > 0.
PROOF: We calculate the derivative ∂η
∂λ








= 1 −η(1 −Eω′) < 1
where the last inequality holds because both η and (1 −Eω′) are positive.
To obtain an expression for ∂ logL
∂λ
, we take a simple average of the first-order conditions
of the firms and then differentiate with respect to λ:
∂ logL
∂λ
= − 1 − 1/J
1 + [1/J + λ(1 − 1/J)](1 −Eω′) < 0;
the absolute value of this expression is less than 1. This fact, when combined with the
inequality ∂η
∂ logL < 1, implies that
∂η
∂λ
> −1; therefore, ∂η
∂λ
+ 1 > 0. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: As in the proof of Proposition 1, our analysis establishes
the existence of a unique equilibrium when λ < 1. This claim follows directly because the
slope of firm j’s best response is given by the same expression as before just letting F ′′ = 0.
(a) From the first-order condition for firm j, we obtain that its markdown is given by
Aj −ω
ω
= sj + λ(1 − sj)
η(L)

Taking an average weighted by market shares now yields Proposition 2’s expression for






= HHI(1 − λ)+ λ
η(L)













1 − λ 
where Ā ≡ (∑Jj=1 Aj)/J. We show that the HHI increases with φ whenever there is varia-






















(1 − λ)+η+ λ
(1 − λ)2
]}















Note that the last factor is positive, because the weighted average of the productivities




























here σ2A = (
∑J
j=1(Aj − Ā)2)/J is the variance of firms’ productivities.
The first factor in the last line of (B.1) is positive as long as (a) there is dispersion in the
productivities and (b) 1+ ∂η
∂λ
> 0, which Lemma 1 establishes while assuming that Eω′ < 1.
Therefore, an increase in λ increases the Herfindahl–Hirschman index.









(1 − λ)− HHI + 1 > 0





















(∂η/∂λ+ 1)(1 − λ)+ (η+ λ)





since 1 + ∂η
∂λ
> 0 and ∂L
∂λ
< 0.
(b) That L∗ decreases with λ was shown in part (a). Because labor supply is increasing,
ω(L∗) also decreases with λ.










1 + μ̄ 
As shown in part (a), μ̄ is increasing in λ and so the labor share must be decreasing in λ.
(d) We showed in part (a) that HHI increases with λ when technologies differ. Now
we show that the minimal productivity for a firm to be viable is increasing in λ. Assume,
without loss of generality, that the firms are sorted by productivity: A1 ≥ A2 ≥ · · · ≥ AJ .
From the firms’ first-order conditions, it follows that the condition for all firms to produce
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1 − λ > 0
The implication is that, in order for the least productive firm to produce in equilib-
rium, its productivity relative to average productivity (AJ/Ā) must exceed the thresh-
old (η+λ)/(1−λ)
(η+λ)/(1−λ)+1/J . This threshold is increasing in λ (assuming that Eω′ < 1). To see
that the threshold is increasing in λ, note that its derivative with respect to λ is
(η+λ)+(1−λ)(∂η/∂λ+1)
J[(η+λ)/(1−λ)+1/J]2(1−λ)2 , which is positive when Eω′ < 1 because (by Lemma 1)
∂η
∂λ
+ 1 > 0.
More generally, a necessary condition for the jth least productive firm to produce a posi-




(η+ λ)/(1 − λ)
(η+ λ)/(1 − λ)+ 1/j 
where Āj = ∑jk=1 Ak/j is the average of the productivities of the most efficient firms
1     j. Therefore, if it is not profitable for firm j to produce in equilibrium with λ, then
neither is it profitable to produce in equilibrium with λ′ > λ. Q.E.D.
The following lemma establishes the comparative statics properties of λintra and λinter
with respect to the common ownership parameters φ, φ̃, N , and J.
LEMMA 2: The terms λintra and λinter are: (i) increasing in φ and φ̃; (ii) for φ > 0 and
φ + φ̃ < 1, and for φ ∈ (01), decreasing in N (but are otherwise constant as functions
of N); (iii) decreasing in J when φ+ φ̃ < 1 but constant as functions of J when φ+ φ̃ = 1;
and (iv) always in [01].
PROOF: Using the expressions for λintra and λinter from Section 4.1, we proceed by es-
tablishing these four claims in turn.






= sgn{(1 −φ)(1 −φ− φ̃)2 + (1 −φ− φ̃)[(2 −φ)φ+ (1 −φ)φ̃N]}
In this expression: the first term is always nonnegative (and positive if 1 − φ − φ̃ > 0);
the second term is always nonnegative (and positive if 1 − φ − φ̃ > 0, and either φ > 0
or φ̃ > 0). Hence the derivative is positive in the interior of φ’s domain, from which it
follows that λintra increases with φ.












here the first term is always nonnegative and positive when 0 <φ< 1, the middle term is
always nonnegative and positive when 1−φ− φ̃ > 0, and the last term is always nonnega-
tive and positive when φ̃ > 0. Thus the derivative is positive in the interior of φ’s domain,
so λinter is increasing in φ.









(1 −φ− φ̃)2N[(1 −φ)2JN + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N(J − 1)
+(J − 1)[(2 −φ)φ+ [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N]]
}
= sgn{(1 −φ− φ̃)2JN[(1 −φ)2N + (2 −φ)φ]};








= sgn{(1 −φ− φ̃)2N(J − 1)[(2 −φ)φ+ [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N]}
because (2 −φ)φ≥ 0 (with inequality if φ> 0). Also, [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃ ≥ 0 (with inequal-
ity if φ̃ > 0) and the derivative is positive in the interior of φ̃’s domain. We therefore
conclude that λinter is increasing in φ̃.






= sgn{[2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃(2 −φ)φ− (2 −φ)φ[(1 −φ)2J − [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃(J − 1)]}
= − sgn{(2 −φ)φ[(1 −φ)2J − [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃J]}
= − sgn{(2 −φ)φ[(1 −φ)2 − [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃]}
= − sgn{(2 −φ)φ(1 −φ− φ̃)2}
As a result, if φ> 0 and 1 −φ− φ̃ > 0, then λintra is decreasing in N .
With respect to λinter, the term that multiplies N in the denominator (i.e., (1 − φ)2J −
[2(1 − φ) − φ̃]φ̃(J − 1) = J(1 − φ − φ̃)2 + [2(1 − φ) − φ̃]φ̃) is positive for φ < 1. The
numerator of λinter is positive for φ> 0, so λinter decreases with N for φ ∈ (01).
(iii) We have ((1 − φ)2 − [2(1 − φ) − φ̃]φ̃) = (1 − φ − φ̃)2 ≥ 0 with equality for φ̃ =
1 − φ. Hence the denominators of both λintra and λinter are increasing in J as long as
(a) 1 − φ − φ̃ > 0 (we have shown already that, if 1 − φ − φ̃ = 0, then λintra and λinter do
not depend on J) and (b) given this condition, λintra and λinter are decreasing in J.
(iv) Since [2(1 − φ) − φ̃] ≥ 0 with equality for φ = 1, it is immediate that the mini-
mum value λintra or λinter can assume is 0. We have shown that λintra and λinter are either
decreasing or constant in N . Thus, they attain their maxima when N = 1, for which
λintra = (2 −φ)φ+
[
2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃
(1 −φ)2J + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃(J − 1) ;
λinter = (2 −φ)φ
(1 −φ)2J + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃(J − 1) 
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Note that λintra ≥ λinter. Also, ((1 − φ)2 − [2(1 − φ) − φ̃]φ̃) ≥ 0 with equality for φ̃ =
1 −φ. Hence both lambdas attain their maxima for J = 1, with λintra’s maximum given by
λintra =
(2 −φ)φ+ [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃
(1 −φ)2 + (2 −φ)φ = (2 −φ)φ+
[
2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃
= (2 −φ− φ̃)(φ+ φ̃);
this expression is maximized for φ̃+φ = 1, which gives a value of 1.
We conclude that both λintra and λinter belong to [01]. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: The derivative of the relative price of a firm’s own sector











































































































PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: The expressions in the proof of Proposition 3 imply the
following relationship between the change in the relative price of sector n and the changes









Referring to Section 4.2.2 , multiplying and dividing by L in the wage effect term, by cn in
the own-industry relative price effect term, and by cm in the other industry relative price




sLnj + λintrasLn−j + λinter
(
1 − sLnj − sLn−j
)]





snj + λintra(1 − snj)− λinter
]= 0;
here snj ≡ F(Lnj)/cn is the share of firm j in the total production of sector n, sLnj ≡ Lnj/L,
and sLn−j ≡ (
∑
k =j Lnk)/L.
For the objective function of firm j in sector n, the second derivative is
∂ρn
∂Lnj
















































Replacing the latter in our expression (B.4) for the objective function’s second derivative




































+ (λintra − λinter)cn − F(Lnj)
cn
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The first row of this expression is negative because ∂ρn
∂Lnj
is negative, F ′ is positive, and








] < 1. The term in the second
row is clearly negative. The third row’s first term is nonpositive but its second term is
















which is the product of three nonpositive factors (rendering the entire expression nonpos-
itive). The fourth row is strictly negative because, with the constant elasticity functional
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sLnj + λintrasLn−j + λinter
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sLnj + λintrasLn−j + λinter
(
1 − sLnj − sLn−j
)]}




, so the second-order condi-
tion’s fourth row is negative.
The objective function of each firm is thus globally strictly concave; therefore, any so-
lution to the system of equations implied by the first-order conditions is an equilibrium.
So in order to find the symmetric equilibria, we first simplify the first-order condition of
firm nj when it is evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium—using cn = c for all n and pn = p
for all n—and then note that cn/C = c/C = 1/N in the symmetric case.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the marginal product of labor is equal to F ′(L/JN). Using
this equality and substituting cn/C = cm/C = 1/N in our expression (B.2) for the change
in the relative price of the firm’s industry when the firm expands employment plans, we












Dividing the first-order condition by the real wage and then substituting the derivatives







sLnj + λintrasLn−j + λinter
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snj + λintra(1 − snj)− λinter
]

In a symmetric equilibrium, the employment share of firm j in sector n is Lnj/L = 1/JN
for all sectors n and all firms j within that sector—that is, since the employment shares
of all firms are the same. Similarly, the product market share of firm j in sector n is






+ λintra(J − 1)
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1/NJ + λintra(J − 1)/NJ + λinter(N − 1)/N
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hlabor













Here Hlabor is the modified HHI for the labor market, which equals (1 + λintra(J − 1) +
λinter(N − 1)J)/NJ, and Hproduct is the modified HHI for the product market of one indus-
try, which equals 1/J + λintra(1 − 1/J).








1 − 1/θ(Hproduct − λinter)(1 − 1/N)

If we combine this equation in L and w/P with the inverse labor supply and then im-




























1 − 1/θ(Hproduct − λinter)(1 − 1/N)

We can obtain a closed-form solution for the constant-elasticity labor supply and Cobb–














1 − 1/θ(Hproduct − λinter)(1 − 1/N)









1 +μ∗ = 1 +Hlabor/η
1 − (1/θ)(Hproduct − λinter)(1 − 1/N)
We next prove four claims as follows. The equilibrium markdown of real wages μ∗ is:
(1) increasing in φ̃;
(2) decreasing in J if φ+ φ̃ < 1 but constant as a function of J if φ+ φ̃ = 1;
(3) decreasing in the elasticity of labor supply η, and
(4) decreasing in θ, the elasticity of substitution among goods by consumers, if φ< 1—
but constant as a function of θ otherwise.
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(1) According to Lemma 2, both λintra and λinter are increasing in φ̃ and so likewise
is Hlabor. We also have
∂(Hproduct − λinter)
∂φ̃















(J − 1)/J(1 −φ− φ̃)2JN[(1 −φ)2N + (2 −φ)φ]
−(1 −φ− φ̃)2N(J − 1)[(2 −φ)φ+ [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N]
}
= sgn{(1 −φ− φ̃)[(1 −φ)2N − [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N]}
= sgn{(1 −φ− φ̃)3}
which is positive for (1 −φ− φ̃) > 0 and so (Hproduct − λinter) is increasing in φ̃. Further-
more, (Hproduct − λinter) ≤ 1 (with equality when φ̃ = 1) and so—in the fraction of our
expression for μ∗ > 0—the numerator is increasing and the denominator is decreasing
in φ̃; therefore, μ∗ increases with φ̃.
(2) We have that




1 + (J − 1)
[
(2 −φ)φ+ [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N]




2JN + J(2 −φ)φ
J
[
(1 −φ)2JN + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]]φ̃N(J − 1) − λinter
= (1 −φ)
2N
(1 −φ)2JN + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N(J − 1)
which is decreasing in J provided that 1 − φ − φ̃ > 0—that is, since ((1 − φ)2 − [2(1 −
φ)− φ̃]φ̃)= (1 −φ− φ̃). If φ+ φ̃ = 1, then Hproduct − λinter is constant in J.
Consider now





1 + λintra(J − 1)
J





(1 −φ)2N + (2 −φ)φ




(1 −φ)2N + (2 −φ)φ+ (N − 1)(2 −φ)φ
(1 −φ)2JN + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N(J − 1)
= 1
(1 −φ)2JN + (2 −φ)φ− [2(1 −φ)− φ̃]φ̃N(J − 1)
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which is decreasing in J as long as 1−φ−φ̃ > 0; otherwise, it is constant in J. We conclude
that: (a) if 1 − φ − φ̃ > 0, then the numerator and denominator in the fraction of our
expression for μ∗ are (respectively) decreasing and increasing in J; and (b) if φ + φ̃ = 1
then those two components are each constant as a function of J. So if 1 −φ− φ̃ > 0, then
the equilibrium markdown decreases with J; otherwise, it is unaffected by J.
Claims (3) and (4) are straightforward given that Hproduct − λinter ≤ 1 always, Hproduct −
λinter > 0 for φ< 1, and Hlabor > 0 always.




































This expression is negative whenever θJ1−1/N − 1 < η1−1/JN + 1JN−1 or θ1+η − N−1JN−1 < 0. Q.E.D.



















































which is positive for J > 1 because ∂λ/∂(1 −φ) < 0. Q.E.D.
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